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PREFACE
This publication is a supplement to the proceedings of the 1984 International
Aerospace and Ground Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity held on June 26-28,
1984, in Orlando, Florida. The conference proceedings are reported in "International
Aerospace and Ground Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity - 1984 Technical
Papers," which is available as NADC-84104-20. This conference was sponsored by the
National Interagency Coordination Group (NICG) on Lightning and Static Electricity
consisting of members from NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the
United States Air Force, Army, and Navy. NICG sponsored the conference in concert with
the Florida Institute of Technology and in association with the Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers, SAE-AE4 Committee, the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Author-
ity, the United Kingdom Royal Aircraft Establishment Farnsborough, and Culham
Laboratory.
This supplement contains papers that were presented at the conference but were
unavailable for printing at the time of publication of the proceedings. The papers
are numbered as they were for the conference. The papers were submitted for publi-
cation in camera-ready form. The material was taken from a variety of sources;
therefore, various units of measure are used.
Use of trade names or names of manufacturers in this report does not constitute
an official endorsement of such products or manufacturers, either expressed or im-
plied, by NASA.
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UPSETSUSCEPTIBILITYS UDYEMPLOYINGCIRCUITANALYSIS
ANDDIGITALSIMULATION
Victor A. Carreno
NASALangleyResearchCenter
Hampton,Virginia 23665
ABSTRACT
This paperdescribesanapproachto predicting the susceptibility of digital systemsto signal
disturbances. Electrical disturbancesona digital system'sinput andoutput lines canbe
inducedby activities andconditionsincluding static electricity, lightning discharge,
ElectromagneticInterference (EMI)andElectromagneticPulsation (EMP). Theelectrical signal
disturbancesemployedfor the susceptibility studywerelimited to nondestructivelevels, i.e.,
the systemdoesnot sustain partial or total physical damageandreset and/orreloadwill bringthe systemto anoperational status. Thefront-end transition from the electrical disturbances
to the equivalentdigital signals wasaccomplishedby computer-aidedcircuit analysis. TheSCEPTRE(systemfor circuit evaluationof transient radiation effects) programwasused. Gate
modelsweredevelopedaccordingto manufacturers'performancespecifications andparameters
resulting fromconstructionprocessescharacteristic of the technology. Digital simulationat
the gate andfunctional level wasemployedto determinethe impactof the abnormalsignals on
systemperformanceandto studythe propagationcharacteristics of thesesignals throughthe
systemarchitecture. Exampleresults are includedfor an Intel 8080processorconfiguration.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of digital electronic systems
onboard aircraft is increasing and these
systems are eventually expected to perform
flight-critical functions on new generation
aircraft, thus creating the necessity for
ultrareliable digital systems. Various
approaches are being taken to achieve
ultrareliable fault-tolerant systems that
will survive the occurrence of
component/subsystem failure. A different
threat to digital systems comes from
internal state changes caused by external
disturbances such as lightning. Aircraft
flying in adverse weather conditions can be
subjected to lightning discharge which will
produce transients on system lines, data
buses, etc. Work has been conducced to
establish the interaction between the
lightning-produced electromagnetic
environment and the aircraft (ref. I).
This work is expected to determine the
induced voltage energy spectrum and levels
inside the aircraft as a result of lightning
discharge and the effects of various
parameters (electronic system location,
cable length, cable type, shielding, etc.)
on the induced voltages.
The inherent characteristics of digital
systems make these induced transients a
major threat since, unlike analog computa-
tional systems, a transient on a digital
system can cause a logic state change
preventing the machine from performing as
intended after the transient. In most cases
after t-he machine has entered into an
erroneous operation, a reset and (or) a
reload are necessary to bring it to normal
operation. This erroneous operation is
called an upset mode and no component or
subsystem failure exists.
Studies of possible changes in program
flow (due to upset) and its relation to
program structure have been under" way for
several years (ref. 2). The purpose of the
work described in this paper is to develop a
methodology through which the susceptibility
of a digital system to induced transients
can be evaluated. A possible by-product is
the identification of system design
procedures that increase or decrease the
vulnerability of the system to threats as
described above. Since the susceptibility
study deals with nondestructive transient
levels, investigation and tests of component
failures caused by excess voltage levels
were performed. Upper bounds were
established for transient voltage level to
avoid failure of the system under test.
The study is divided into two parts:
(I) translation of transients into digital
equivalents using component-level circuit
analysis by associating logic levels with
the transient disturbance, and (2) fune-
tionai-i<_vel digital system simulation and
transient injection using "digital
equivalent transients" produced by this
circuit aralysis. Figure I illustrates the
methodoi<gy described in this paper.
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
The waveshapes used for transient in-
jection _re shown in figure 2. These
waveshap_s are re,_ommended by SAE subcom-
mittee AF,qL (ref. 3) for lightning-induced
tra_:sicn_ studies. They are representative
of the form of voltages and currents that
may be present in cables in a lightning-
produced electromagnetic environment. The
waveshapcs are intended for direct injection
on system pins and lines, and levels of the
waveshap_'s are restricted to nondestructive
levels.
Wheq analog transients are injected on
digital _ystem lines or pins they reach the
interfacing circuitry in the system devices.
A prediction of the behavior of the
interf_c'_ng digital circuitry when driven
with the analog transient was performed by
analyzing the circuitry at the component
level using the SCEPTRE (system for circuit
evaiuatinn of transient radiation effects)
prc_am. Circuit topology is converted to
an equivalent SCEPTRE circuit description to
be used as input data for the SCEPTRE
program. Transistors and diodes are modeled
using _he basic elements necessary for the
SCEPTRE equivalent circuits, including
resistors, capacitors, inductors, current
and voltage sources. Values for the
Ebers-Moil transistor model and the diode
model were obtained from manufacturers' data
and from information of typical fabrication
processes for monolithic integrated
circuits. A family of component-level logic
models for use in SCEPTRE analysis including
gates, flip-flops, and tri-state devices
has l,._e.<developed for this study for transis-
tor-tra_.sistor logic (TTL) and complementary
metal _w_de semiconductor (CMOS) technology.
A typical transten_ injection circuit
used to generate transients coupled to
digital devices and shown in figure 3 was
designed, breadboarded and tested to compare
its operation with SCEPTRE analysis of
such a circuitry. The tank circuit is
eormec<;el to the injection point through a
paralle I _Y< _ircuit for isolation. Since
the injection point of the circuit under
test has a nonlinear input impedance, the
waw_shape at the injection point is clipped,
nonsinusoidal, and thus unlike the
sinusoidal tank output. The SCEPTRE code
accurately models this circuit as shown in
figures 4 and 5. To achieve the nonclipped
SAE recommended waveshape at the injection
point, an idealized injection circuit was
defined !'or use with SCEPTRE in the upset
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susceptibility study. Theidealized circuit
is accomplishedin the SCEPTREcodevia a
mathematicalfunction andhasa low
impedancesource,perfect switches,andvery
high frequencyresponse.
Figures6 and7 are examplesof the
responseof a D-typeflip-flop usedin a
latch circuit to the modeledinjection cir-
cuit andthe idealized transient signal.
Thetransient wasinjected on the data input
line while the flip-flop wasdisabledandin
a high state. In the first example,using
the oscillating tank injection circuit, the
flip-flop state waschangedfroma high to
low state. In the secondexample,using the
ideal injection source, the flip-flop does
not experiencea state change. Thus,the
injected signal harmoniccontentas well as
the couplingcircuit hasan impacton the
circuit analysis results.
SYSTEM SIMULATION
An 8080 microprocessor-based computer
system was simulated in the functional-level
simulation study. This system was chosen to
provide comparison with a similar hardware-
based study (ref. 4). Functional-leve_
s_mulation was accomplished with the General
Simulation Program (GSP) (ref. 5) running on
a CDC Cybcr 170-730 computer. This program
has the capability for 16 functional models
such as counters, microprocessors, latches,
etc. The modeling is performed with a
microcode instruction set. Variable
propagation delay and internal registers can
be implemented in the simulation. An
example of a flip-flop model described with
the microcode is listed in table I.
Figure 8 shows the system block diagram
used in the upset susceptibility study. An
extra module was designed and added to the
model system to access the system lines for
injection purposes. The injection module is
inserted in the line on which injection is
intended. Under normal operation, the
system signal propagates through the
injection module unaltered with no time
delay. Therefore, this module, when
disabled, is completely transparent to the
remaining modules. When the injection
module is enabled, the affected line signal
is controlled by the user running the
simulation. The digital equivalent signal,
derived from the SCEPTRE circuit analysis
using the idealized transient signal, was
used to control the affected line. State
changes of latches at either end of the
affected line are used to introduce logic
errors into the digital signals transmitted
over the line according to the results of
the circuit analysis.
The program executed during injection
studies is in table 2. The program loads a
byte from memory into the accumulator,
stores the accumulator into memory and jumps
to the first instruction at memory location
(1000)16. in a continuous loop. This program
exercises three of a possible ten machine
cycles (table 3) and is intended to provide
a correlation of the machine cycles with the
upset conditions. The first set of hardware
tests was performed and reported in
reference _ using this program.
The program is loaded in RAM starting
at memory location ROM location (1000)16.
When the simulation starts, the
microprocessor is initialized equivalent to
a power on reset. It loads and executes a
jump instruction in (0000)16 and after 6500
nanoseconds the microprocessor starts
executing the program in RAM address
(I000)16.
The time of the transient injection
into the system was determined by selecting
a random number between 0 and 15000 and
adding it to 6500. The time required by the
microprocessor to execute the program in RAM
once is 15000 nanoseconds. Therefore, the
injection can occur with equal probability
at any point in the program. The random
numbers were obtained from a table of random
numbers (ref. 6) and normalized to meet the
boundary requirement.
TEST RESULTS
During initial upset test runs, opera-
tion codes (op-codes) that are undefined in
the microprocessor instruction set were
loaded in the instruction register as a
result of the injected transients. The
simulation microprocessor model treated
these undefined op-codes as "no operation"
instructions. A program that makes use of
the undefined op-codes was written and ex-
ecuted in hardware to determine the response
of the microprocessor to such codes, and
modifications were made to the microproces-
sor model accordingly. Of the 12 undefined
codes 7 acted as one byte instruction and
execution continued with the next immediate
byte and 5 acted as control instructions
with the next two bytes as part of the in-
struction. No attempt was made to reproduce
with the microprocessor model the control
output signals generated when the hardware
microprocessor is executing the undefined
op-codes.
Sixty-six transient injections were
performed during program execution. Each
transient injection was performed on a
single line at a time and in all 66 cases
the injected signal was the digital equiv-
alent of a I MHz damped sinusoid. The
points of tne injectlons in the system were
MDI , MDI , and MDI of the input data bus,
DB °of th_ output d_ta bus, D o of the
bidirectional data bus, and MAD of the
O
memory address bus.
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During execution, the microprocessor
bidirectional data bus, high and low address
bus, system output data bus, and chip selec-
tion control lines were monitored, as well
as the pins and internal registers of the
microprocessor model. Locations in memory
that were not used for the program were
loaded with zero (00)._ in the simulation as
ID
opposed to the hardware test (ref. 4) where
unused memory locations had random content.
Therefore, when program control was trans-
ferred to a memory location out of the
defined program, the no-operation instruc-
tion NOP (O0).r was loaded and no undefined
io
status word was observed during any of the
transient injection runs. Forty-one system
anomalies were registered including 24
errors and 17 upsets. System anomalies,
errors and upsets for each injection line
are summarized in table 4. In the error
case, the microprocessor stored or loaded
erroneous data, stored data in a non-
specified location or skipped an instruction
but went back to the normal program loop.
In the upset case, the microprocessor went
out of the program loop to empty or nonex-
istent memory locations. Simulation test
results on system errors and upsets as a
function of injection lines were comparable
with hardware results with the exception of
the memory address line (MAD) where no er-
rors or upsets were registered in 346 injec-
tions in the hardware test and seven errors
and four upsets were recorded in 11
injections in the simulation test. Further
tests are presently being performed to
resolve the difference between hardware and
simulation upsets caused by injections on
the MAD line. Of 17 upsets, 13 were caused
when th_ injection was performed during the
jump instruction. These results point to an
apparent higher susceptibility to upset of
the program control instruction. Table 5
shows the classification of upsets and
errors when the injections were performed
during load (MVIA), store (STA) and jump
(JMP).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The simplicity of the program executed
during transient runs permitted observation
of the patterns that led to the upset con-
dition. The upset susceptibility is highly
dependent on program structure (ref. 2).
When I bit of a 3-byte instruction is
changed, the instruction could become a
l-byte instruction, and the two next
immediate data bytes are then loaded as
instructions. This condition was observed
12 times during the 66 upset test runs and
three of those cases led to upset. In
total, 29 data bytes were read as
instructions and the effect on the program
flow depended on the data value, its
4 14-4
location in the program, and the instruction
immediately after the data byte or bytes.
Although none of the test runs caused
the original program in RAM to be partially
or totally overwriting, the potential for
overwritten program was identified in the
error cases when the microprocessor stored
data in memory locations different from
those specified.
Results of the study can be used to
obtain the parameters necessary for a sto-
chastic model, similar to the stochastic
model in _eference 4, to compute suscep-
tibility _f the system. The methodology
described provides the capability of per-
forming upset tests and establishing an
upset susceptibility level for a system
usinE models developed during design stages.
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TABLE i - FLIP-FLOP MODEL WITH GSP MICROCODE
; MODEL J K
;DECLARATION OF INTERNAL REGISTERS
;NO INTERNAL REGISTERS ARE NEEDED IN J K MODEL
REG(1) DUMMY
;DECLARATION OF ALL EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS
;PIN EX(150) FOR SIMULATION CONTROL PURPOSES
PIN J(1),K(2),Q(3),QBAR(4),CLK(5),EX(150)
;PROPAGATION DELAY SPECIFICATION
EVW OUT(15)
INT:
LATCH:
END
BEQ CLK,LATCH
BEQ J,K,INT
MOV(OUT) J,Q
MOV(OUT) K,QBAR
MOV #0,EX
BEQ J,LATCH
COM (OUT) Q
COM(OUT) QBAR
MOV #O,EX
; IF CLK EQUAL ZERO JUMP TO LATCH
; IF J EQUAL K JUMP TO INT
; GIVE Q THE VALUE OF J AFTER A 15
; NANOSECOND DELAY
; GIVE QBAR THE VALUE OF K AFTER A 15
; NANOSECOND DELAY
; TERMINATE THE EXECUTION OF
; THIS MODULE
; COMPLEMENT THE VALUE OF Q
; INSTRUCTION IS EXECUTED WHEN J=K
; COMPLEMENT THE VALUE OF QBAR. THIS
; INSTRUCTION IS EXECUTED WHEN J=K
TABLE 2 - PROGRAM CODE EXECUTED DURING INJECTION STUDIES
CLOCK
CYCLES
ADDRESS INSTRUCTION MNEMONIC
7 10 O0 3E MVIA
01 CB
13 02 32 STA
O3 19
04 10
I0 05 C3 JMP
06 O0
07 10
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TABLE 3 - 8080 MACHINE CYCLES AND CORRESPONDING8-BIT
STATUS SIGNALS IN HEXADECIMAL FORMAT
MACHINE CYCLE STATUS SIGNAL
INSTRUCTION FETCH A2
MEMORYREAD 82
MEHORYWRITE O0
STACK READ 86
STACK WRITE 04
INPUT 42
OUTPUT 10
INTERRUPT 23
HALT 8A
INTERRUPT WHILE HALT 2B
TABLE 4 - SYSTEM ANOMALIES AT EACH INPUT POINT ON THE
SIMULATED SYSTEM UNDER TEST
INPUT SYSTEM
POINTS INJECTIONS ANOmaLIES ERRORS UPSETS
MDI ° II (11) 6 (11) 2 (3) 4 (8)
MDI3 11 (11) 4 (11) 2 (0) 2 (ii)
MDl 7 II (II) i0 (Ii) 7 (I) 3 (10)
Do 11 (2) 11 (2) 6 (1) 5 (i)
MAD° 11 (346) 11 (0) 7 (0) 4 (0)
DB° II (720) I _0) I (0) 0 (0)
66 43 25 18
( ) Hardware test results.
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TABLE 5 - UPSETS AND ERRORS FOR TRANSIENT INJECTIONS
DURING INSTRUCTION CYCLE
NO UPSET
ERRORS
MVIA STA JMP TOTAL
11 10 4 25
14 10 0 24
UPSET 1 3 13 17
TOTAL 26 23 17 66
SAE
WAVE FORMS
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Figure i. Methodology for susceptibility study.
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Figure 2.
DAMPED SINUSOIDAL WAVEFORM
v1, v21
"" RISE TIME,
WAVEFORM FREQUENCY ns DAMPING
] 1 MHz (± 20%) 50 MAX AMPLITUDE DECREASES
2 10MHz(.+20%) 5 MAX 25-50'_:: IN 4 CYCLES
DECAYING EXPONENTIAL WAVEFORM
V3' i_
O.
O. - _t
WAVEFORm _ id (i_s)
3 500 MAX 170(+20%)
4 JO0 MAX 2('+20%)
SAE waveforms recommended for ]Sghtming-induced testing.
HIGH
VOLTAGE
SOURCE
O-120OV
l
TO CIRCUIT
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Fig_e 3. Transient generator circuit.
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Figure 2. Transient input signal on the flip-flop D line of a
hardware setup using a tank injection circuit (i V, 200 ns).
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Figure 8. System under test.
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DATANDRESULTSOFA LABORATORYINVESTIGATION
OFMICROPROCESSORUP ETCAUSEDBYSIMULATED
LIGHTNING-INDUCEDANALOGTRANSIENTS
CelesteM. Belcastro
NASALangleyResearchCenter
Hampton,Virginia 23665
ABSTRACT
Advancedcompositeaircraft designswill includefault-tolerant computer-baseddigital control
systemswith high reliability requirementsfor adverseaswell as optimumoperatingenvironments.
Sinceaircraft penetrateintenseelectromagneticfields during thunderstorms,onboardcomputer
systemsmaybesubjectedto field-induced transient voltagesandcurrents resulting in functional
error modeswhichare collectively referred to as digital systemupset. Amethodologyhasbeen
developedfor assessingthe upsetsusceptibility of a computersystemonboardanaircraft flying
througha lightning environment. Laboratorytests wereperformedto studyupseterror modesin a
general-purposemicroprocessor.Theupset tests performedinvolved the randominput of analog
transients whichmodelllghtnlng-lnducedsignals onto interface lines of an8080-basedmicrocomputer
fromwhichupseterror datawererecorded. Theprogramcodebeingexecutedon the microprocessor
during tests wasdesignedto exerciseall of the machinecyclesandmemoryaddressingtechniques
implementedin the 8080central processingunit. For specific processingstates andoperations,
correlations are establishedbetweenupsetoccurrenceandtransient signal inputs. Theapplication
of Markovmodelingto upset susceptibility estimation is discussedanda stochastic upset
susceptibility modelfor the 8080microprocessoris presentedto demonstratestochasticmodel
development.
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INTRODUCT ION
Lightning strikes to a_rcraft cause tran-
sient voltages and currents to be induced on
internal electrical cables throughout the
aircraft. These transient signals can
propagate to interface circuitry, power lines,
etc., of onboard electronic equipment despite
shielding and protection devices. Advanced
composite aircraft provide less shielding than
all-metal aircraft and will utilize computer-
based digital control systems that are in-
herently sensitive to transient voltages and
currents. Since these digital systems will be
performing flight-critical functions, highly
reliable performance must be maintained in
adverse environments such as thunderstorms.
Therefore, techniques for assessing the sus-
ceptibility, performance, and reliability of
digital systems when subjected to analog
electrical transients must be developed.
Digital system upset collectively refers
to functional error modes without component
damage in digital computer-based systems and
can be caused by lightning-induced electrical
transients. An upset test methodology was
developed and described in detail in (I)*
along with initial data and results. In this
paper, more extensive data and results of
upset tests performed using this methodology
are presented. The purpose of these tests is
to statistically investigate the upset suscep-
tibility of a general-purpose microcomputer
executing an application program in a
simulated lightning environment. The ob-
jective of the statistical analysis is to
identify correlations between the occurrence
of upset and the processing activity of the
system (which includes software as well as
hardware) that is in progress when input of an
analog transient signal occurs. In addition,
the analysis serves to demonstrate the ap-
plication of upset susceptibility assessment
techniques. These techniques could be used as
an aid in identifying system weaknesses that
could be hardened to upset but may be
especially useful during the design phase of
system development. The application of Markov
modeling to upset susceptibility prediction
for an upset tolerant system is discussed
viewing upset caused by lightning as a random
process and using test observations as a basis
to demonstrate the development of an upset
susceptibility model for the general-purpose
microcomputer.
* Numbers in parentheses designate references
at end of paper.
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UPSET TEST METHODOLOGY
The upset test methodology is based on
the comparison monitoring of two synchronized
Intel Intel!ec 8/Mod 80 microcomputers (_Cs)
executing identical program code concurrently.
The Intellec 8 Mod/80 is a modular system
based on the 8080 microprocessor (uP) and is
configured for 8K bytes of random access
memory (RAM), 4K bytes of programmable read-
only memory (PROM), h input ports, and h
output ports. The comparison monitor compares
the 8-bit data bus, 16-bit address bus, and 8
control lines from each Intellec 8 microcom-
puter and indicates that an error has occurred
if a difference on any line is detected. One
of the microcomputers is designated as the uC
under test (uC UT) and the other micro-
computer serves as a reference (REF uC) on
which the comparison is made. A third
microcomputer provides input data to the _C UT
and REF uC, initiates interrupt requests, and
is referred to as the I/O uC. The upset test
hardware configuration is shown in figure I.
The _C UT is perturbed by an analog tran-
sient signal. The analog electrical transient
is a ! _,_z damped sinusoid of negative
polarity, and was designed to model an
electrical signal that could be induced by
electromagnetic fields associated with light-
ning discharges. The waveshape of the tran-
sient signal is an approximation of a waveform
recommended for lightning-induced effects
testing (2). The analog transient is directly
coupled through a normally open relay onto a
single Line within the uC UT and its
amplitude, therefore, is restricted to the
damage threshold of components within the test
unit. input of the transient signal occurs
pseudo-randomly in that it is controlled using
the output of a counter that is initialized
with a pseudo-random number generator.
Randomness is desired so that the transient
signal input is not synchronized with
processing activity of the test unit. This
establish_s a more realistic laboratory
simulation of the random process that might
take place in the actual lightning environment
than inpulting transient signals during a
processing activity that is established a
priori. Therefore, data recorded from upset
tests in which transient signal inputs
occurred randomly during program execution,
rather than by an a priori determination,
should provide the best solution to a Markov
upset susceptibility model.
Two types of data are obtained during
each upset test--error data and the error
detection time. Bit patterns from the data
bus, address bus, and control lines of the uC
UT are acquired with a Tektronix 9103 Digital
Analysis System (DAS), which is triggered when
the analog transient is input to the uC UT.
If the comparison monitor indicates that an
error occurred, the acquired error data is
storedonmagnetictape. TheDASis then
reset for anotherdataacquisition. Theerror
detection time is determinedby countingthe
numberof clock cycles that occur in the
Intellec _C's from the input of the transient
signal to the detectionof anerror. Since
the Intellec _C's havea 2 MHzclock, the
numberof elock cycles is multiplied by 500ns
to obtain the error detection time. Theerror
detectiontime is a function of the processing
delaytimeswithin the systemundertest as
well as the speedandefficiency of the com-
parisonmonitor, or error detector. Although
there is very little literature on upsettest-
ing, workhasrecently beendoneon the
developmentof monitorsfor upsetdetection(3).
UPSETTESTDESCRIPTIONANDDATASUMMARY
Theprogrambeingexecutedon the pCUT
andREF_Cduring upsettests wasstored in
PROManda flow chart of this programandthat
of the I/OuCis shownin figure 2. The_CUT
andREFpCset the stack pointer, initialize
variables, output a preset constantto an I/O
port, andinput an8-bit datawordfromthe
I/O pC. This 8-bit wordis checkedto see if
it lies within a certain range. If the data
wordis not within the range, it is stored in
memoryandanother8-bit wordis input to be
checked. If the 8-bit wordis in the range,
it is divided by a constantandstored in
memory.Duringtheseupsettests, the 8-bit
datawordwasa constantwithin the desired
range. ThepCUTandREFuCthenoutput
anotherpreset constantto an I/O port,
retrieve frommemorythe 8-bit wordresulting
fromthe division, subtract a constantfrom
it, andstore this final value in memory.A
loop in whichnooperationsare performedis
thenexecuteduntil the I/O uC initiates an
interrupt request which causes an RST 6
instruction (slngle-byte jump to memory
location 0030) to be executed. The interrupt
routine causes the final 8-blt value to be
output to an I/O port. Once this is done, the
_C UT and REF uC halt until the I/O _C
initiates a second interrupt request which
causes an RST 7 (slngle-byte jump to location
0038) to be executed. The second interrupt
routine causes the uC UT and REF pC to
reexecute the test program which, therefore,
operates in a continuous loop. This test
program was not written for efficiency or to
perform some real application but to be
representative of a typical applicatlon
program and include instructions from all five
8080 instruction groups (table I) that
collectively require all ten 8080 machine
cycles (table 2) and utilize all four memory
addressing modes available in the 8080 (table
3).
The analog transient signal was input to
the memory data input bus of the _C UT a total
of 120 times--30 times each on the four least
significant lines of the input data bus from
memory (MDIO, MDII, MDI2, MDI3). The memory
data input bus is multiplexed onto the
bidirectional data bus of the 8080 CPU (along
with input data from the I/O ports and inter-
rupt instructions from a peripheral device)
and was chosen as the transient signal input
site because transient signal inputs on this
bus resulted in a large number of errors
during the upset tests reported in (I). The
specific lines within the bus as well as the
number of transient signal injections per line
were arbitrarily selected. Each of the 120
transient signal injections to the uC UT
produced either upset or benign errors.
Benign errors caused no divergence from cor-
rect flow between the main program and sub-
routines but included incorrect values read
from or written into memory and repe_ted or
erroneous states within an instruction cycle,
and could be a potentially serious anomaly.
For these tests, any divergence from correct
program flow was classed as upset whether or
not correct program execution was reestab-
lished. Upsets recorded during testing
occurred as a result of program execution
returning from a subroutine to the wrong
memory location, which in some cases was the
second or third byte of a multibyte instruc-
tion. In some instances, program execution
continued to the location at which the return
should have occurred, and correct program flow
resumed with or without benign errors for the
duration of the data acquisition. In other
cases, program execution went back and forth
between two routines in an erroneous loop that
was not exited within the time frame of the
data acquisition. These findings are consis-
tent with the upset characterization described
in (4). The number of upsets and benign
errors that occurred as a result of transient
signal inputs at each of the four injection
points is shown in table 4. Tables 5-7 show
the number of upsets and benign errors that
resulted from transient signal inputs during
processing of the various instructions within
each of the instruction groups, the various
memory addressing modes, and the various 8080
machine cycles, respectively.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
A statistical analysis was performed to
identify processing modes of the 8080 _P that
contain some types of activity which may be
more critical than other types to the overall
susceptibility of the _C system to upset
caused by analog transients. A hypothesis
test for each processing mode was performed in
which the hypothesis being tested was that
upset and benign errors occur with equal prob-
ability regardless of the processing activity
underway when the transient signal is input to
the uC UT. This hypothesis is tested by
arranging in tabular form the number of
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observedupsetsandbenignerrors resulting
fromtransient inputs duringeachprocessing
activity underconsideration. A calculation
of the expectedvaluefor eachentry, assuming
the hypothesisis true, is then performed,
whichenablesthe chi-squarestatistic of the
samplepopulationto be calculated. If the
calculated chi-squarestatistic is less than
the actual valueof an approproprlate
chi-squaredistribution, then the hypothesis
is true. Otherwise,the hypothesisis not
true andmustbe rejected.
Tables8-10showthe observationtables,
associatedjoint probabilities andconditional
probabilities, andchi-squarestatistics for
several instruction groups,addressingtypes,
andmachinecycles, respectively. Since, in
eachof thesetables, the calculatedchl-
squarestatistic exceedsthe valueof the
chi-squaredistribution, the hypothesisbeing
tested in eachof thesecasesmustbe
rejected. This meansthat differences in the
indicated probabilities are statistically
significant rather than beingdueto chance.
That is, it cannotbeassumedthat upsetand
benignerror occurrencesare equiprobablefor
transient signal inputs duringexecutionof
the various instruction type, addressing
modes,or machinecycles. Thedatabaseac-
cruedduring thesetests is insufficient to
identify whichinstruction groups,addressing
modes,andmachinecycles aremostcritical to
upset vulnerability. This is becauseof the
diversity in the relative frequencywith which
activities in eachprocessingmodeoccurred
duringexecutionof the test program. There
wereactivities in eachprocessingmodethat
occurredso infrequently that they wereunder
wayfewor no times whenthe transient signal
wasinput to the pCUT. Identification of
critical activities in eachmodecouldbe
accomplishedby additional tests usingoneor
morespecially written programsin whichthe
relative frequenciesof occurrencearemore
uniform.
To test the hypothesisthat upsetand
benignerror occurrencesare equiprobablefor
transient signals injected oneachof the four
least significant lines of the memorydata
input bus, the chi-squarestatistic shownin
Table11wascalculated. Sincethe calculated
chl-squarestatistic is less thanthe valueof
the chl-squaredistribution, the hypothesis
cannotberejected. That is, upsetandbenign
error occurrencesare equally probableregard-
less of the llne (amongthe four least sig-
nificant bits of the input databusfrom
memory)onwhichthe transient signal is in-jected.
Theoverall performanceof the 8080-based
microcomputercanbeconvenientlysummarized
in a Markovchainof discrete states asshown
in figure 3. Thestate transition probabil-
ities 8i] are definedas
eli = P(i+ jlstate i) = _ <I>
Ni
whereI,_],]is the numberof observedtransitions fromstate i to state j andNiis the numberof timesstate i wasob-
served. Thequantities 8ij representthe
probability of transition along the
indicated pathanddonot representstate
probabilities or provideinformation
regardingtransition sequence.
STOCHASTICMODELING
In order to obtain a probabilistic
time histcry of the 8080-basedsystem
responseto the analogtransient, a stoc-
hastic Markovmodelcould beconstructed
consistingof discrete states in con-
tinuoustime. Thestates andtransition
pathswouldbe the sameas thoseshownin
figure 3. However,the transition paths
wouldbecefined in termsof transition
rates Aij rather than probabilities 81j.If constanttransition rates wereassumed,
_ij wouldbe the inverseof the meantransition time fromstate i to state j,
whichwouldhaveto bedeterminedex-
perimentallyor usingcomputersimulation(5). Transition time betweenstates could
beevaluatedby countingthe elapsednum-
ber of clock cyclesanddividing by the
clock frequency. Transition rates Ill
couldalso beestimatedwith the 81j by
solving the simultaneousequations:
^ 812 <2>
_13
^ ^
A,2 + I_3
= 8,3 <3>
^ ^ = O21 <4>
_21 + _25
: 023 <5>
= O,l <6>
_32
^ 8,2 <7>
Once all transition rates have been deter-
mined, a transition rate matrix Q would be
formulated:
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Q = [qij ] =
-(_12
+ _13) _12 _13 q
_21 -(_21 + _23) _23
The transition rate matrix Q would then be
used to determine the probability PiJ(t)
of occupying state j at tlme t given that
the process was in state i. This prob-
ability is the solution to the following
system of differential equations (6):
<8>
P_j(t) = E qik PkJ (t) <9>
k
with initial conditions
l; ;Plj(O) = if i j <10>if i j
The time-varying state probabilities
Pl.(t) for the Markov model constructed as
in3flgure 3 represent a characterization
of the upset susceptibility of the
8080-based microcomputer. Since thls
system was not designed for upset
tolerance, upset detection and recovery
states cannot be added to the model for a
reliability characterization. However,
stochastic modeling could be used to
characterize the susceptibility of the
digital system to upset,
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A laboratory experiment was conducted,
using a general-purpose microcomputer, to
investigate upset caused by analog
electrical transients similar to those
that could be induced by lightning. Data
were obtained from120 tests in which 85
upsets and 35 benign errors were detected.
Error modes involving a divergence from
correct program flow were classed as upset.
Benign errors caused no divergence from
correct flow between the main program and
subroutines but included incorrect values
read from or written into memory and repeated
or erroneous states within an instruction
cycle, and could be a potentially serious
anomaly. A statistical analysis was per-
formed in which it was determined that
upset and benign error occurrences are not
equiprobable for transient signal inputs
during execution of the various instruc-
tion types, addressing modes, or machine
cycles. Additional testing would have to
be performed to identify which instruction
groups, addressing modes, and machine
cycles are most critical to upset vul-
nerability. This type of analysis could
be used as an aid in identifying system
weaknesses that could be hardened to upset
but may be especially useful during the
design phase of system development. A
stochastic model, based on upset test
data, was defined for the general-purpose
microcomputer assuming constant transition
rates. Solution of this model would
provide tlme-varying state probabilities
that represent an upset susceptibility
characterization of the test system.
Thus, the application of stochastic model-
ing for upset susceptibility prediction
seems very promising. However, the op-
timum transition rate distribution must be
determined.
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TABLEI: 8080INSTRUCTIONGROUPS
GROUP
DATATRANSFER
ARITHMETIC
LOGICAL
BRANCH
STACK,I/O, AND
MACHINECONTROL
DESCR I PTION
MOVE DATA BETWEEN REGISTERS
OR BETWEEN REGISTERS AND
MEMORY
ADD, SUBTRACT, INCREMENT,
DECREMENT DATA IN REGISTERS
OR MEMORY
AND, OR, EXCLUSIVE-OR,
COMPARE, ROTATE, COMPLEMENT
DATA IN REGISTERS OR MEMORY
CONDITIONAL/UNCONDITIONAL
JUMP, SUBROUTINE CALL,
RETURN
INPUT, OUTPUT, MAINTAINING
STACK AND INTERNAL CONTROL
FLAGS
MACHINE CYCLE
INSTRUCTION FETCH
MEMORY READ
MEMORY WRITE
STACK READ
STACK WRITE
INPUT READ
OUTPUT WRITE
INTERRUPT ACKNOWLEDGE
HALT ACKNOWLEDGE
INTERRUPT ACKNOWLEDGE
WHILE HALTED
TABLE 2: 8080 MACHINE CYCLES
DESCRIPTION
READ INSTRUCTION FROM MEMORY;
INCREMENT PROGRAM COUNTER;
DECODE INSTRUCTION
READ BYTE FROM MEMORY;
INCREMENT PROGRAM COUNTER
WRITE BYTE TO MEMORY
READ BYTE FROM STACK;
INCREMENT STACK POINTER
WRITE BYTE TO STACK; DECREMENT
STACK POINTER
READ BYTE FROM INPUT PORT
WRITE BYTE TO OUTPUT PORT
READ INSTRUCTION ON DATA BUS;
DECODE INSTRUCTION
CPU ENTERS HALT STATE
READ INSTRUCTION ON DATA BUS;
DECODE INSTRUCTION
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TABLE 3: 8080 ADDRESSING MODES
MODE
DIRECT
REGISTER
REGISTER INDIRECT
IMMEDIATE
DESCRIPTION
BYTES 2 AND 3 OF THE
INSTRUCTION CONTAIN THE EXACT
ADDRESS OF DATA
THE INSTRUCTION SPECIFIES THE
REGISTER OR REGISTER-PAIR
CONTAINING DATA
THE INSTRUCTION SPECIFIES THE
REGISTER-PAIR CONTAINING
ADDRESS OF DATA
THE INSTRUCTION CONTAINS THE
DATA ITSELF
TABLE 4: NUMBER OF UPSETS AND BENIGN ERRORS THAT OCCURRED
PER INJECTION POINT
INJECTION
POINT
NO. OF NO. OF NO. OF
INJECTIONS UPSETS BENIGN ERRORS
MDIO 30 22 8
MDII 30 25 5
MDI2 30 21 9
MDI3 30 17 13
120 85 (71%) 35 (29%)
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TABLE5: NUMBEROFUPSETSANDBENIGNERRORSTHATOCCURRED
PERINSTRUCTIONGROUP
INSTRUCTION NO. OF NO. OF
GROUP UPSETS BENIGN ERRORS
DATA TRANSFER 7 3
ARITHMETIC 3 4
LOGICAL 0 2
BRANCH 52 14
STACK, I/O, AND 23 12
MACHINE CONTROL
TABLE 6: NUMBER OF UPSETS AND BENIGN ERRORS THAT OCCURRED
PER ADDRESSING MODE
ADDRESSING NO. OF NO. OF
MODE UPSETS BENIGN ERRORS
DI RECT I 4
REGISTER I 2
REGISTER INDIRECT 15 6
IMMEDIATE 47 12
NONE 21 11
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TABLE 7: NUMBER OF UPSETS AND BENIGN ERRORS THAT OCCURRED
PER MACHINE CYCLE TYPE
TYPE OF NO. OF NO. OF
MACHINE CYCLE UPSETS BENIGN ERRORS
INSTRUCTION FETCH 27 I0
MEMORY READ 36 8
MEMORY WRITE 4 I
STACK READ 2 I
STACK WRITE 5 2
INPUT READ 0 0
OUTPUT WRITE I 0
INTERRUPT ACKNOWLEDGE 0 0
HALT ACKNOWLEDGE I0 9
INTERRUPT ACKNOWLEDGE 0 4
WHILE HALTED
BENIGN ERRORS
UPSET
TOTAL
TABLE 8: STATISTICS FOR UPSET AND BENIGN ERROR OCCURRENCE
PER INSTRUCTION GROUP
C I C 2 C 3
BRANCH STRK, I/O, HC OTI_RS TOTAL
14 12 9 35
52 23 I0 85
66 35 19 120
PB u(C[ ): PROBABILITY THAT A CATEGORY I INSTRUCTION IS BEING EXECUTED WHEN THE
' UPSET/BENIGN ERROR-CAUSING TRANSIENT SIGNAL IS INPUT
PB(CI) - 0.117 PB(C2) - O.I00 PB(C3) - 0.0750
Pu(CI) = 0.433 Pu(C2) - 0.192 Pu(C3) - 0.0833
P(B, U/Ct): PROBABILITY OF UPSET/BENIGN ERROR OCCURRENCE GIVEN THAT A CATEGORY i
INSTRUCTION IS BEING EXECUTED DURING TRANSIENT SIGNAL INPUT
P(B/Cl) - 0.212 P(BIC 2) - 0.343 P(B/C 3) - 0.474
P(UIC I) - 0.788 P(UIC 2) - 0.657 P(UIC 3) - 0.526
CALCULATED CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC: X 2 - 5.51
(TABLE VALUE: X 2 - 4.61)
a- 0.10
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TABLE 9: STATISTICS FOR UPSET AND BENIGN ERROR OCCURRENCE
PER ADDRESSING MODE
C1 C2 C 3
IMMEDIATE NONE ,ITHERS TOTAL
BENIGN ERRORS 12 11 12 35
UPSET 47 21 17 85
TOTAL 59 32 29 120
PB u(CI ): PROBABILITY THAT THE CATEGORY t ADDRESSING MODE IS BEING EXECUTED WHEN THE
UPSET/BENIGN ERROR-CAUSING TRANSIENT SIGNAL IS :NPHT
PB(CI) = 0,100 PB(C2) = 0.0917 PB(C3 ) - 0.100
PuCC I) - 0._2 Pu(C2) : 0.175 Pu(C3 ) - 0.I42
P(B, U/C[): PROBABILITY OF UPSET/BENIG_ ERROR OCCURRENCE GIVEN THAT THE CATEGORY i
ADDRESSING MODE IS BEING EXECUTED DURING TRANgIENT SIGNAL INPUT
P(BIC I) : 0.203 P(BIC 2) - 0.324 P(B/C 3) - 0.414
P(UIC I) - 0.797 P(U/C 2) - 0.656 P(U/C 3) - 0.586
CALCULATED CIII-SQUARE STATISTIC: X 2 - 4.72
(TABLE VALUE: X2 - 4.61)
_- 0.10
REN IGN ERRORS
TA!ILF IO:
PER MACHINE CYCLE TYPE
STATISTICS FOR UPSET AND BENIGN ?IRRDH ,_C,::i!_RENCE
C1 C2 r 3
INST. F MEM. R. HTFERS TOTAL
I0 8 t_, _£
Uf'£,ET 27 36 2P 85
TOTAL 37 411 _r_ 1 20
PB.u(CI): PROBABILITY THAT THE CATEGORY t MACHINE CYCLE i:: E{E:NG f:XECtITED WHEN THE
UPSET,q!ENION ERROR-CAUSING TRANSIENT S[GNAL 1S [_p[rr
PB(CI) = 0,C833 PB(C2) = 0.0667 PB(C3 ) - 0.It_2
Pu(Cl) - 0.>2'i Pu(C2) - 0.300 PH(C3 ) = 0.183
P(B, U/CI): PROBABILITY OF UPSET/BENIGN ERROR OCCURRENCE (,IVF:N THAT THE CATEGORY i
MACHINE CYCLE IS BEING EXECUTED DURING TRANSIENT ::_GNAL INPUT
P(B/C 1) : 0.270 P(B/C 2) = 0.182
P(U/C 1) = 0.730 P(U/C 2) - 0.818
CALCULATED CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC: X 2 - 6.51
(TABLE VALUE: X 2 " 5.99)
a- 0.O5
P(B/C 3) - 0.436
P(U/C 3) - 0.564
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TABLE 11: STATISTICS FOR UPSET AND BENIGN ERROR OCCURRENCE
PER TRANSIENT SIGNAL INPUT POINT
BENIGN ERRORS
UPSETS
TOTAL
C I C2 C3 C 4
MDIO MDII MDI2 MDI3 TOTAL
8 5 9 13 35
22 25 21 17 85
30 30 30 30 120
PB,u(Ci ):
TRANSIENT SIGNAL BELONGS TO CATEGORY i
PB(CI) = 0.267 PB(C2) = 0.167
Pu(CI) = 0.733 Pu(C2) = 0.833
CALCULATED CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC: X 2 = 5.28
(TABLE VALUE: ×2 = 6.25)
c_ 0.10
PROBABILITY OF UPSET/BENIGN ERROR OCCURRENCE GIVEN THAT THE INPUT POINT OF
PB(C3 ) = 0.300
Pu(C3 ) = 0.700
P(B/C 4) = 0.433
P(U/C 4) = 0.567
I
I/o _c /_C UT
PSEUDO-RANDOM ]
TRANSIENT SIGNAL
INJECTOR
REF #C
DATA REQUEST, CODES
HLDA, INTE, INTA
Figure i. Upset test hardware configuration.
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I/0 _P #C UT/REF _C
I _ZZ-Z
I_ INPUT ,NlC J • --f_ ,NPUl ,00 _- .....
OUTPUI__INT , REQ [ DIVIDE Jr--i
:_i_., Loo_
E__ E___co_ j L......
_u, ,_,E ] __ S_^CT J
____5___
T
OUTPLII INf. RZQ I--_ _ IN_ERR'JPI_,
Figure 2. Flow chart of upset test _C programs.
821
 YT
STATE I: SYSTEM IS FAULTED BY TRANSIENT SIGNALS
STATE 2: UPSET HAS OCCURRED
STATE 3: BENIGN ERRORS HAVE OCCURRED
812 - 0.017 021 - 0.024 e31 - 0.153
013 - 0.983 823 - 0.224 832 - 0.606
Figure 3. State model for Intellec 8/Mod 80 system response
to analog transient signal.
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LIGHTNING RESEARCH--A USER'S LAMENT
Cyril N. Golub
USAF Eastern Test Range, Patrick AFB, Florida
ABSTRACT
As a user of devices and procedures for lightning protection, the author
is asking the lightning research community for cookbook recipes to help him
solve his problems. He is lamenting that realistic devices are scarce and
that his mission does not allow him the time nor the wherewithal to bridge
the gap between research and applications. A few case histories are
presented.
In return for their help he is offering researchers a key to lightning
technology--the use of the Eastern Test Range and its extensive resources as
a proving ground for their experiment in the lightning capital of the United
States. A current example is given--a Joint lightning characterization
project to take place there. Typical resources are listed.
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INTRODUCTION
The part of this presentation that's reflected in the title highlights
the problem we have in the operations arena in adapting findings of
lightning research to practical applications. What we need are cookbook
recipes.
In the other part of the presentation we offer one key to further
discoveries in lightning technology and that is the use of an instrumented
proving ground located in the lightning capital of the United States.
THE PROVING GROUND
Invoking author's license I am going to reverse the sequence and tell
you about our test facilities first. This way if I succeed in interesting
you in using them, you may also decide to get involved in helping out the
poor operator with his hardware problems. First of all, as I said a little
earlier our proving ground is located in the lightnlng capital of the United
States--well, maybe not the capital but certainly the suburbs. The lightning
capital itself is right here in central Florida. Some of the thunderstorms
have a te,dency to evaporate as they reach the Atlantic Coast but we still
get our share of them. The proving ground itself is a combination of two
areas: the first one is the Eastern Test Range managed by the US Air Force
and extending from Cape Canaveral, about 60 miles east of here, to the Indian
Ocean, about I0,000 miles to the southeast. For our purpose here we are
talking mainly of Cape Canaveral proper and its restricted airspace allowing
3-dimensional operations with only token coordination with other airspace
users. For those of you who are not entirely familiar with our operations
all space and missile launches, whether Air Force, NASA, Army, Navy or others,
take place from Cape Canaveral with the exception of the Space Shuttle. The
Space Shuttle is launched from the other area referred to earlier and that is
the NASA Kennedy Space Center on Merritt Island, just west of Cape Canaveral
between the Banana and Indian Rivers. Both areas are shown in Fig. i. It is
also intended to have the Shuttle orbiter return to and land at KSC, at
least on some of the missions. This has happened once so far, but future
landings depend heavily on major improvements in Air Force weather
"nowcasting" currently being implemented at a cost of several million dollars
jointly funded by NASA and the Air Force.
Even as I write, a lightning characterization project is getting
under way there under the direction of the US Air Force Wright Aeronautical
Laboratory in cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), NASA (Kennedy Space Center and Langley
Research Center), the French Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches
A_rospatiales (ONERA), the Centre d'Etudes Nucleaires de Grenoble (CENG), and
other interests. They are bringing with them an instrumented lightning
research aircraft and special ground instrumentation. This project is a good
example of what we can do for other researchers. The local support is
provided jointly by NASA_at KSC and by the Air Force at Cape Canaveral and
nearby Patrick Air Force Base (PAFB). NASA will be providing a launch site
for lightning-triggering rockets supplied by CENG and some data support
services. The Air Force will be providing meteorological services which are
in the process of being modernized to the extent that next year they will be
the most advanced services available anywhere. The Air Force is acquiring a
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MclDAS-lineage forecasting system and already has a state-of-the art weather
radar, meteorologicaJ sounding system, field mill network, lightning location
and protection system, and mesoscale network.
The weather radar is a special version of a National Weather Service
radar; this version can detect very light precipitation of the order of
0.01 in3/hr. Next year it will incorporate a volumetric capability for
providing displays along any cross section desired. Also next year we will
have our ownGOESEast and West Earth stations instead of depending on a tap.
Other Air Force support includes air traffic controllers, precision radar and
optical tracking, aircraft vectoring data with respect to thunderstorm cells
andother weather features, air andground voice communicationas well as more
mundane functions ranging from aircraft fueling and ground support to
portapotties for visiting scientists at remote sites. We also provide
feeding facilities as well as snake bite and other health care. Last but not
least nature unlimited will be unleashing lightning, turbulence, downdrafts,
and other violent manifestations but refuses to coordinate them with Cape
scheduling so that we'll have to play this part by ear.
So, you ask, howmuchdo you have to pay for this support if you want to
conduct lightning research, either natural or triggered, either cloud to
ground, or intercloud? Someof it is for free, such as available work space
and "routine" meterological services which here go well beyond the usual
connotation of "routine." You will also benefit from the multi-million
dollar improvements we are making in our "nowcasting" techniques, as
mentioned earlier. Someof the support you may need has to be paid for such
as site preparation, radar operator time outside of normal shift time,
aircraft fuel, and so on. By site preparation, I mean making available
access roads, electric power, communications and such at remote sites not now
available for your particular requirements. As an example, the on-going
lightning characterization project mentioned earlier called for a seashore
site where a ground plane could be set up on the beach and a parking site
provided nearby for an instrumented research trailer to study electro-
magnetic propagation over the ocean. No such site existed so that we had to
provide stabilizing material for a roadway over the loose sand as well as
extension of existing utilities to the selected site. The costs involved are
what we call "reimbursable." However, there may be ways of offsetting some
of these costs. As mentioned in the opening of this paper and expandedon in
the second half of this presentation, we have a lightning protection project
for which we need specific application data that we are willing to pay for if
not available otherwise; we maybe able to enter into agreements with various
organizations doing lightning research at the Cape to provide this type of
data for a consideration which may be used to subsidize a portion of such
research projects. In such cases the resulting net cost to the user of
Eastern Test Range facilities is nominal and the benefits are outstanding.
And as you can see for yourselves such extensive support facilities are hard
to duplicate elsewhere. I can provide additional information on how to apply
for the use of our facilities at the end of this presentation.
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FROM LIGHTNING RESEARCH TO LIGHTNING PROTECTION
And now for the kind of lightning protection data we need at the Eastern
Test Range (ETR) and Kennedy Space Center. We are in need of such data
especially at the ETR which is strictly operational and not geared for
research, hence my lament and our need for cookbook recipes.
Our main concern is the protection of sensitive electronics and various
facilities from the diverse effects of lightning, ranging from direct strikes
to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects and including surges in power lines
and damage to payloads. I'ii give some examples of problems we've had and
the solutions we've developed for some of them.
Some of the more fundamental problems have already been treated by some
of my fellow workers such as Jim Stahmann of the PRC Systems Services Co., at
KSC, Martin Uman of the University of Florida, Phil Krider of the University
of Arizona and Mike Maier of Lightning Location and Protection, Inc. Some of
my friends at the Wright Aeronautical Laboratory, Dick Richmond and Major
Pete Rustan in particular, have determined different lightning signatures
depending on geographical location and are investigating other possible
differences as a function of the generating mechanism. My French colleagues
at ONERA, CNEG, and other organizations have pointed out the high-frequency
characteristics of lightning signals and the potential of interferometric
methods for lightning locations as close to home as Valkaria, Florida, some
30 miles south of Cape Canaveral.
It may even be that the cookbook recipes we are looking for are already
in existence but so far they have eluded us. Now I am not talking about
"standard" protection such as listed in NFPA 781 . Some of it works, and some
of it doesn't. What we need are products of the latest findings in lightning
characteristics. Particularly lacking is operationally feasible protection
against EMP inductive effects.
Some of the things we have done include conventional air terminals and
cones of protection, power surge protection, open-phase detectors, transient
protection on data lines, grounding of antenna towers with a quarter-wave
stub, and so on. A fairly standard procedure is to use a 2/0 instrumentation
ground bus. Depending on the location, it may or may not be connected to the
power neutral, the power grounding conductor and the building frame. During
a cursory survey made a couple of years ago the following and more were
found: A current of 0.4 ampere was measured in the ground bus. The shields
on communication lines between two sites had been tied back and taped at both
ends (probably in a desperate attempt to reduce ground loops). Some
grounding cables shown on construction drawings could not be found. A DC
return line was jumpered to the AC neutral. Grounding clamps were loose or
corroded. Power surge suppressors took three cycles to react.
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CONCLUSION
Lightning researchers of the world, have a heart for us practitioners--give
us cookbook recipes such as "in case of lightning type X , use device Y to
protect component Z ." Tell us about fiber optics for transmitting signals
or pneumatic lines for actuating devices neither of which are affected by
lightning or its inductive effects. But be specific, give us tried and
ready-to-use solutions. We cannot afford to go around testing
"off-the-shelf" devices only to find that they don't work. As you well know
in the lightning business you usually have only one shot at success--if you
mess up, it may well be "curtains" for your project and quite possibly for
you too.
i,
"Lightening Protection Code,"
1980.
REFERENCE
National Fire Protection Association, vol. 78,
17-5 29
II" x
LPLWS
(I,aunch Pad I,ightning Warning System)
l ocati_'_n of Field Mill Sites.
Figure i. Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and NASA Kennedy
Space Center.
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AC Power Line Protection For An
IEEE 587 Class B Environment
William D. Roehr and O. Melville Clark
General Semiconductor Industries, Inc.
Tempe, Arizona
Abstract
The 587B series of protectors are unique low
clamping voltage transient suppressors to protect ac-
powered equipment from the 6000V peak open.circuit
voltage and 3000A short circuit current as defined in
IEEE Standard 587 for Category B transients. The
devices, which incorporate multiple-stage solid-state
protector components, have been specifically de-
signed to operate under multiple exposures to maxi-
mum threat levels in this severe environment. The
output voltage peaks are limited to 350V under maxi-
mum threat conditions for a 120V ac power line,
thus providing adequate protection to vulnerable
electronic equipment. The principle of operation
and test performance data is discussed.
Introduction
As electronic systems become more sophisti-
cated and make use of the newer higher density
integrated circuits, their transient vulnerability
increases. Equipment manufacturers are becoming
increasingly aware that equipment must be de-
signed to survive in a transient environment. Tran-
sient problems should not be left for the user to
solve, but unfortunately, this has often been the
case. The user is ill equipped for the task because
he usually does not know system limitations or have
the necessary test equipment to personally evaluate
the plethora of protective devices available.
The IEEE 587-1980 Standard is a reasonable worst
case definition of the transient environment "_. By
preceding equipment with a suppression network
which reduces such transients to a specified maxi-
mum level, designers can insure that equipment
malfunction or damage will rarely occur.
Topics to be discussed include the IEEE 587 Stan-
dard, suppressor design approaches, and test
results of a suppressor module designed to protect
equipment from the IEEE 587 transient environment.
The Transient Environment As Defined By The
IEEE Standard 587
Several years of work by many people on IEEE
committees have culminated in the publication of Stan-
dard 587-1980 which defines transient conditions
occurring in low voltage (less than 600 volts) ac
power circuits. It addresses transient voltages
which exceed twice the peak operating voltage
with durations ranging from a fraction of a micro-
second to a millisecond, and originating primarily
from system switching and lightning effects. The
standard also proposes tests which approximate the
real-world transient conditions for the purpose of
evaluating the survival capability of equipment con-
nected to power circuits.
Three location categories are defined: "A" and
"B" for indoor applications, and "C" for outdoor
applications. The location categories are further
defined in Figure 1. They take into consideration
the increase in source impedance from the outside
to locations well within the building. Table 1 sum-
marizes the test waveforms used for categories A
and B, which are primarily for indoor residential,
commercial and light industry applications. The
waveforms are detailed in Figure 2.
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Location Categodu
A. Outlets and Long Branch Circuits
All outlets at more than 10 m (30 ft) from
Category B with wires #14--10
All outlets at more than 20 m (60 ft) from
Category C with wires #14--10
B. Major Feeders and Short Branch Circuits
Distribution panel devices
Bus and feeder systems in industrial plants
Heavy appliance outlets with '_horr' con-
nections to the service entrance
Lightning systems in commercial buildings
C. Outside and Service Entrance
Service drop from pole to building entrance
Run between meter and distribution panel
Overhead line to detached buildings
Underground lines to well pumps
A : B
='t
i
I
I
I
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FIGURE 1
IEEE Std. 587-1980, Location Categories
OPEN SHORT
LOCATION CIRCUIT CIRCUIT
CATEGORY WAVEFORM VOLTAGE CURRENT
05_us-10OkHz 6000V 200A
A Ring (Fig. 2A)
0.5#s-100kHz 6000V 500A
Ring (Fig 2A)
1.2 x 50ps
B Impulse (Fig. 2B) 6000V ---
8 x 20,us
impulse (Fig 2C) -- 3000A
TABLE 1 -- Waveform Characteristics
---- vm.
o g v_., __ _
OlV_ -
05#s
FIGURE 2A
0.5 ps -- 100kHz Ring Wave
0 9 V_.,
0 3 V_
T, -J
0 5 V__
I
I
_50 Us
T, 1 67 : 1 2Os
FIGURE 2B
, /
091_.0 t i_,
T_ • I 25 B _S
FIGURE 2C
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Another area worth summarizing from Standard
587-1980 is the rate of transient voltage occurrence.
Transient occurrence varies over wide limits de-
pending upon the power system, its loading and the
amount of lightning activity.
Data collected from many sources have led to
the plot shown in Figure 3. This prediction shows
with certainty only a relative frequency of occur-
rence, while the absolute number of occurrences
can be described only in terms of low, medium, or
high exposure• These exposure levels are defined
in general terms as follows:
(1) Low Exposure. Systems in geographical
areas known for low lightning activity, with little
load switching activity.
(2) Medium Exposure. Systems in geographi-
cal areas known for high lightning activity or
frequent and severe switching transients.
(3) High Exposure. Rare but real systems
powered by long overhead lines and subject to
reflections at line ends, where the characteristics
of the installation produce high sparkover levels
of the clearances.
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Rate Of Surge Occurrences At Unprotecled Locations
A suppressor for use in most indoor location
categories is adequately designed if it both pro-
tects and survives the occurrences shown on the
medium exposure line. For example, it should
survive a 6kV transient eight times, a 2kV transient
400 times, etc. for a 10-year life expectancy.
It should be emphasized that IEEE 587-1980 is
not a test specification• It simply defines the open
circuit voltages and short-circuit currents which
are most applicable to certain location categories•
Transient voltage suppressors tested to the IEEE
standard can be easily compared in terms of output
voltage under identical input conditions. Besides
specifying an output level, it is helpful to have out-
put waveforms available• The fast rising portion
of the ring wave (dv/dt = 12kV//Js) is prone to excite
self-resonance in L-C networks which may produce
spurious output signals.
Other Line Transient Conditions
Fast rising transient wavefronts have also been
observed on ac lines caused by switching transients
generated close to the point of observation. As the
distance between the points of origin and observation
increases, line inductance and capacitance causes
the wavefront risetime to decrease.
The possibility of a nuclear electromagnetic pulse
(NEMP) on the power line should also be con-
sidereal, particularly if essential military equipment
is to be protected. Hard data describing the pulse
are scant, but it is believed that, since its point
of entry to the power lines is widespread, a fast
rising pulse would appear in the power system.
The pulse is usually described as having a rise in the
kv/ns range and a decay of a few microseconds
depending upon the altitude of the burst _z_. The
spectrum extends roughly from 10KHz to 100MHz
which easily excites the resonant frequencies of
a system.
Development Of Suppressor Specifications
Based upon the preceding discussion of the
transient environment on ac power lines, an intel-
ligent spec can be composed. A decision must first
be made whether the equipment location is best
described by category A or B of IEEE 587-1980.
Second, the maximum clamping voltage output must
be selected. Since 400 volts is a standard voltage
rating for economical semiconductors and capaci-
tors, it is desirable to have the output level of the
suppressor comfortably below 400 volts. For a
Category B location suppressor, Table 2 shows
a suitable set of transient specifications.
MAXIMUM O#IEN I_HOirr.
PROTECTION CILAMRINO CIRCUIT CIRCUrr
¥OLTAG| VOLTAGE WAVlr FORM CURRENT WAVIFORM
Ditter_efltial
(Line to Neutral) 350V 6kV 1.2 x 50/J$ 300OA 8 x 2Ops
Common 50OV 6kV 2 x 250ns 200A 2 x 250ns
(Neutral to Ground)
TABLE 2--Transient Voltage Suppreuor Speclflcatlonl
The NEMP test (2x250ns) is based more on test
capabilities rather than on an accurate representa-
tion of reality• The intent of the test is to insure that
no overshoot occurs at the output, regardless of the
rate of rise of the transient waveform.
Design Approaches
A general topology for transient protectors is
shown in Figure 4 using the notations of Jacobus (3_.
The diverter devices handle high currents but do
not offer a precise control of voltage; gas tubes and
MOV's are typical diverting elements. The clamp
devices have low impedance and therefore offer
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better voltage control but have lower current capabi-
lities A TransZorb® Voltage Suppressor diode is
a typical clamping device. The series impedances
shown semi-isolate the various diverter and clamp
stages by causing a voltage drop between them.
To meet the requirements of IEEE 587-1980, Cate-
gory B, the topology of Figure 4 has proven to be
quite cost effective. The series impedances are
inductors. Depending upon the intended applica-
tion, L sections could be added to or removed from
the topology of Figure 4.
o - DtVERTER
AC Z -= IMPEDANCE
LINE C -- CLAMP
FIGURE 4
General Topology For A Protection Network
Capacitors can be added across the diverting and
clamping elements to slow the rate of rise of fast
pulses. Properly designed, the network of Figure 4
will provide rather precise voltage limiting, as well as
slowing the rate of rise of fast switching transients of
NEMP. Methods of sizing the diverter, clamp, and
inductive elements are discussed in the Jacobus
paper. However, experience has taught that a practi-
cal design requires a good deal of attention to com-
ponent selection and extensive testing.
Specifically, Jacobus suggests using the reactance
of the series inductors at 100KHz to calculate net-
work currents and voltages. For the 0.5us/100KHz
ring wave, using 100KHz reactance makes some
sense; however, the highest stress is caused by the
unidirectional impulse waves which have a much
lower frequency content. Furthermore, the clipping
action of the diverters creates a somewhat flat-
topped wave with a width of about 50ps. In addition,
the coils, and shunt capacitors if used for high-fre-
quency filtering, serve to stretch the pulse. Accord-
ingly, a frequency of about 10KHz is more realistic
to use for rough calculations; however, testing often
indicates that inductors need to be much larger than
calculated.
Shunt capacitors across the second diverter and
the clamp element perform a valuable service in
slowing the fast rise of incoming disturbances. The
equivalent circuit of such a filter network is shown
in Figure 5. The parasitic stray capacitances Of the
inductors, Csl and Cs_, allow very fast pulse edges
to shoot through the filter but they are attenuated by
the shunt capacitances and clamped by the element
C. A fast responding device, such as a TransZorb
TransZorbe is a registered trademark of
General Semiconductor Industries Inc
Cs_ ,
L, c/_,L_
Cm T C_
"4" L5
Co_ Cc
Ls2 _ _
C3
Rs2_ ,
FIGURE 5
Suppressor, is threrefore preferable for element C.
The capacitances of the diverter, Co, and the clamp,
Cc, usually provide a lower impedance shunt at very
high frequencies than the discrete capacitors C_ and
C2, which have more pronounced series parasitic
inductance.
Note that the LC networks form series resonant
circuits. To avoid large circulating current, their
resonant frequencies should be well removed from
the IOOKHz frequency typical of a lightning surge.
Empirically, it was determined that having the
resonant frequency of L1 and O1 considerably above
100KHz and that L2 and C2 well below 100KHz pro-
vided the cleanest output.
Test Results Of The 587B Series Of
Protective Modules
The General Semiconductor Industries' 587B family
of ac power line protectors are designed to meet the
specification of Table 1. Figure 6 shows the response
to the unidirectional wave with open circuit voltage
of 6000 volts and short circuit current of 3000
amperes. The top trace shows the voltage across a
12-ohm resistor which represents a 10A equipment
toad. The lower trace shows the dramatic reduction
of the transient peak provided by the protector. Note
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time--us
FIGURE 6--Transient Reduction
At Equipment Input Provided By Supprlmaor
Upper Traoe: No Protection Lower Trace: Protector Output
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the relatively slow rate of rise of the output pulse
(25V/_us) and the peak level of 300 volts on the de-
tailed photo of the output shown in Figure 7.
500 -
400-
300-
I
0
> 200
100
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Time--_us
FIGURE 7.
Magnified View Of Protector Output
The output level with a ring wave input is shown
in Figure 8. The protector used is rated for 20
amperes ac current; the load simulates a 2-amp
resistive load. The output noise is felt to be accept-
able for most applications. The noise increases as
the load current is reduced below 5A. Should the
noise prove objectionable when the ac load is light,
a high-frequency load consisting of a 0.5pf capacitor
in series with a 62-ohm resistor may be placed across
the output.
FIGURE 8--Protector Output With
Ring Wave Input (6kV, 500A)
Figure 9 shows the output when a simulated
NEMP is applied. The extremely fast rise (3kv/ns)
generates a small amount of high-frequency noise,
which is normally not objectionable.
Applications And Installation
The 587B series of modules can handle the worst
expected transients in an indoor environment. The
modules are especially valuable when used in data
processing and complex communications and
instrumentation equipment.
Whenever a high-voltage transient is present on
the ac line, a large transient current will flow line
to neutral and/or neutral to ground. It is important
that the ac input to the module and the ground are
distant from other wiring to prevent electromagnetic
FIGURE 9--Protector Output With EMP Input
(6kV, 120A) 20V/OIv.; S0us/DIv.
coupling. Should the transient current flow out the
ground (green) lead, the impedance of the ground
circuit causes conductive parts of the equipment
cabinet or enclosure to rise--possibly several kilo-
volts--above the building earth ground. A potentially
hazardous situation for personnel and equipment
referenced to a different ground connection exists.
To reduce the undesirable potential difference
between equipment, a practice called bonding is
used. Bonding consists of connecting all conductive
items together that are expected to conduct currents
tO earth. The bonding conductor must be sized
properly for the high surge currents expected and
must be solidly connected to each piece of equip-
ment using the shortest possible path. All equipment
is cross connected together to provide the lowest
resistance that is practically achievable. Further
information on grounding and bonding--vital to the
equipment installer--is given in reference 3 and its
references.
Summary
By placing a transient protection module between
the ac power line and electronic equipment, failures
caused by power line transients can be virtually
eliminated, if the module handles the IEEE 587 en-
vironment under repeated surges, limits its output
voltage to a safe defined maximum, and is installed
properly.
Test results of a module fulfilling these require-
ments have been discribed. Peak output voltage has
been shown to be under 350 volts regardless of the
input waveform, provided that the stress levels of
IEEE 587 are not exceeded. Also, it has been noted
that proper grounding and bonding of equipment
are essential for the protection of equipment and
personnel.
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CORROSION PROPERTIES OF SECOND-GENERATION CONDUCTIVE MATERIALS
EARL GROSHART
THE BOEING AEROSPACE COMPANY
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Since the introduction of silver-filled
epoxy adhesives and silver-filled nitro-
cellulose lacquer as RFI control materials
in the 60's a number of new materials have
been introduced. The resin carriers have
been changed in an effort to make the
materials more usable or more EPA accept-
able and the fillers have been varied in an
effort to make the materials less costly.
This work was done to assess the corrosion-
related properties of these second-
generation materials.
THE CONDUCTIVE ADHESIVES
The adhesives available are either epoxy or
silicone with a wide variety of formula-
tions (one and two part, heat activated,
flexible, etc.). The fillers are no longer
exclusively silver. Copper, nickel and
carbon have been added to the list. Table I
summarizes the conductive adhesives tested
in this study.
These tests were made using the adhesives
in typical lap-bond specimens as shown in
Figure I. These were used because both
corrosion and adhesive strength data could
be obtained on the same specimen. Three
sets of five specimens were made up for
each adhesive to be evaluated. The sub-
strate material used was bare 2024-T4
Aluminum which had been thoroughly
chemically cleaned in a chromic acid-
sulfuric acid solution within four hours of
the application of the adhesive. Each
adhesive was mixed, catalized, thinned and
cured according to the manufacturers'
instructions.
After curing, the DC resistance was
measured across the half-inch overlap using
a Keithly 502 meter. The sets were then
separated for environmental exposure. One
set (5 Specimen) was subjected to I0 days
of 5% salt fog according to ASTM B I171; a
second set was placed for ID days in a
condensing humidity cabinet at 105°F and
the third set was stored under the con-
trolled environmental conditions of 40% RH
at 60 + 5 °F.
Following these exposures, the DC resist-
ance across the joints was remeasured and
all of the specimens were pulled to obtain
the lap - bond shear strength of each
adhesive.
In addition to using the resistance and
lap-bond shear degradation as a measure of
the corrosion, the corrosion was evaluated
visually at the interface between the
adhesive and substrate and inside the
opened joint.
CONDUCTIVE ADHESIVE DISCUSSION
The silver-filled epoxy systems in general
show increase in resistance value after
both salt and high humidity environments.
The materials in I and 2 (Table I) were the
older systems and were used here to act as
comparisons for the newer systems. In No.
3 the high resistance and lack of corrosion
products are probably a result of the poly-
amide reaction with the aluminum before
curing; even though this change affected DC
resistance it did not affect lap-bond shear
strength and while the values are higher
for the salt spray samples in this set, it
was felt to be a characteristic of the set
rather than the environment. This is
implied by the data spread.
Control data - high 1480 low 1360
Salt Spray - high 1490 low 1430
Humidity - high lOgO low I040
The edge effect was typical of a silver/
aluminum interface; there is a minor attack
at this interface just as in samples I and
2. The silicone materials (Nos. 5, 6, 7),
regardless of filler tend to maintain a
uniform resistance. This appears to be a
result of the silicone materials not
allowing the environment to reach the
aluminum. The galvanic corrosion at an
interface also appears to be minimum and
typical.
Using a copper filler as in sample No. 8 is
much like using silver except the corrosion
products are blue-green. The nickel-filled
materials (Nos. 6, 9, and lO) maintained the
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DC resistance quite well and there was
little evidenceof corrosion in the faying
surface; however,at the aluminuminterface
in all cases there waspitting corrosion.
This is probablybecausethe nickel powder
is not completelywetted and encapsulated
as are the silver particles. Carbon,the
one sampletested here, apparentlydid not
contribute to corrosion.
The glass beadsin the flexible adhesive(No. 4) apparently kept the overlap joint
openso the environmentcould penetratethe
entire half-inch area, as indicated by the
dark adhesivethroughthe joint.
Thesingle part, heat-activated epoxy (No.
ll) showed the same trend as the chemically
cured materials.
CONDUCTIVE COATINGS
A number of conductive coatings were tested
in the same environments, i.e., lO days of
5% salt spray and IO days of condensing
humidity.
These tests were conducted on 6" x6" acrylic
panels which had been sprayed or brushed
with two coats of the test material and on
I" x 4" aluminum panels where the coating was
either brush or dip applied.
The DC resistance of the acrylic panel(s)
was measured before and after exposure to
the environments. The data are shown in
Table II.
The aluminum, which was 2024-T4 alloy with
only chemical cleaning, was used just to
evaluate corrosion, since these coatings
would not normally be used on aluminum but
very often must be in contact with it.
Both the salt spray test and the humidity
test were used. The pictorial results are
shown in figure 2.
The results presented in Table II are not
surprising. The original values are
reasonably close to manufacturers'
advertised values. Humidity does not
appreciably affect this value while the
salt fog causes some deterioration of the
coatings. This deterioration is as much
within the resin as within the fillers.
The corrosion of the aluminum does show
galvanic effects which are accelerated by
the nickel fillers but the 2024 alloy by
itself is corroded severely in this
environment.
CAULKING COMPOUNDS AND GREASES
Caulks and greases shown in figure 2 are:
(a) caulks (Nos. 9, I0, II, and 14) and (b)
greases (Nos. 15, 16, and 17), Number 18 is
a caulk that acts as a grease.
No resistance values were taken on these
except to check the bulk resistance of the
"as received" materials. This value is
shown with the material description in
Table Ill.
These materials (also) did not protect the
2024 Aluminum sample but on samples lO and
II the corrosion product is misleading
since the salt could not be removed from
the soft material. On sample 14 the
corrosion was a green color and a copper
color. This is a result of the copper
particle which was coated with silver.
Another observation not readily observable
from these photographs is that the nickel
coatings were very prone to pitting. This
again is because the nickel does not become
completely encapsulated by the resins.
CONCLUSIONS
This has been a very limited study in that
2024 Aluminum has been used as the only
substrate material. It is also a very
severe test using lO days of salt fog as
the corrosive environment. Both of these
were done intentionally. They provide the
worst possible conditions and result in the
quickest trends.
If a noble material such as silver, nickel
or carbon is sandwiched with aluminum an
increase in DC resistance will result given
time. If this is unsatisfactory
electrically it should either not be used
or have all corrosive environments
excluded. While even under these
conditions one would not expect too much
mechanical damage, some of the pitting
caused by the nick_l fillers could cause
aluminum rivets to break and the large
corrosion product formed in the salt
environments can introduce unwanted
mechanical stresses.
FUTURE WORK
Using the test arrangement shown in the new
APR 14812, many of these coatings, used in
the more typical environments of
electronics, will be evaluated under RF
influences. This will help to further
characterize the uses in design-related
environments.
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TABLE I
CONDUCTIVEADHESlVES
( I l l
I I
I I
I# I DESCRIPTION IORIG. ISALT IHUMID. I STD.
--=I................I .....I......I.......I......
lITwo-part epoxy--10.O09 I 2.55 I 0.163 I 865
Isilver filled l I I I
I l I I I
f I I I I
I I I I I
--I................I .....I......I.......I......
21Two-part epoxy--10.Ol4 I0.618 O.llO I 1297
IRESISTANCE (OHMS) AVEILAB-BOND SHEAR PSI I
ADHESIVE i.....................I....................I
SALT IHUMID I CORROSION
I
I
....... i ......
2.120 11290
I
i
865 ] 1082
I
I
I
I
...... i ......
968 I 1040
I
I
...... i ......
1470 I I050
I
I
Tsilver filled I I
I I I
--I................I .....I......i
31Two-part epoxy--12.056 12.926
Ipolyamide-silverl I
Ifilled I I
INo corrosion of thel
lhumidity sample.
ISlight corrosion
1of the salt spray.
ISome edge attack.
I ...................
INo corrosion in the
Ifaying surfaces.
ISome edge attack.
I ...................
INo corrosion in the
Ifaying surfaces.
ISome edge attack.
--I................I .....I......I.......I......I......I......I...................
41Two-part epoxy--lO.104 18.94 115.50 598 204 283 ICorrosion in faying
lw/ flexibilizer-I I Isurface of both
Isilver-coated I I lenvironmental sam-
Iglass beads I I Iples. Adhesive very l
I I I Idark in salt spray I
I I I Isample. I
--I ................ I ............ I....... I ...... I ...... I...... I ................... I
51Single-part 10.046 10.067 I 0.064 I 49 I 52 I 48 ICorrosion very
Isilicone-silver I I I I I I Iminimal.
Ifilled I I I I I I I
--I ................ I...... 1...... f....... I ...... I...... I...... I ...................
61Single-part 10.205 10.219 1 0.200 I 150 I 120
Isilicone-nickel I I I I I
Ifilled I I I I I
I I I I I I
I--I ................ I ...... I ...... I ....... I ...... I ......
71Si ngl e-part I1.05
Isi I i cone-carbon
Ifilled
--I ......................
81Two-part epoxy-- 0,052
Icopper filled
I
I
I
I
I
I--I ................ f......
I 91Two-part epoxy--IO.O05 I0.86
I lnickel filled l I
I I ( I
12.94 I 1.93 I 160 82
I I
I I
...... I ....... I ............
1.52 1.92 1251 1050
...... i .......
I 0.36
I
I
130 INo corrosion in
Ifaying surface.
IModerate edge
Ipitting.
...... i ...................
go INo corrosion
[attributed to the
ladhesive.
...... i ...................
lifO ISome green in
Ifaying surface of
Isalt panel. Same
ledge attack. No
Icorrosion on the
lhumidity sample.
ICopper turned dark.
...... I ............ I ...................
Samples came apart during environ-
mental test. Severe pitting at
edges.
I--I................I .....
llOISingle-part heat40.Ol2
I Icured epoxy-- I
I Inickel filled I
I I I
I I I
I I I
I--I................i .....
IllISingle-part heai>lO.Ol8
I Icured epoxy-- I
I Isilver filled I
I
I......I.......I......I......
10.015 0.010 200 160
I
I
I
I
I
I......I.............I......
13.6 I0.56 1340 920
I I
I I
I I I I
...... I ...................
200 INo corrosion.
ISevere pitting
I0.006 deep in the
Isalt test. O.OOl -
10.002 in the
lhumidity test.
...... l ...................
I032 IQuite visable
Icorrosion in the
Isalt spray sample.
ILittle edge attack.
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TABLEI I
RESISTANCEOFCOATINGS
I I
I i RESISTANCE (OHMs/SQ.)
i I..................................
I MATERIAL i ORIGINAL SALT HUMIDITY
I.....I....................................i ..........,......................
1 WATER-BASED ACRYLIC - NICKEL FILLE_I 87. I00 + 84
2 WATER-BASED LATEX - CARBON FILLED 987. --- lO0 +
3 SOLVENT-BASED ACRYLIC - SILVER 2.71 13.4 4.67
FILLED BLUE
4
5
w ....
6
7
I .....
I 8
I
If2
I
I .....
ll3
i
I
POLYURETHANE - SILVER FILLED .008 .09 .Ol
SOLVENT-BASED ACRYLIC -SILVER .098 50.I 1.2
FILLED
ACRYLIC LACQUER-CARBON FILLED 9.8 lO0 + 9.2
HEAT-ACTIVATED ONE-PART EPOXY - 0.31 1.7 0.30
SILVER FILLED
SOLVENT-BASED ACRYLIC - SILVER ll.lO lO0 + ll.5
FILLED
SOLVENT-BASED ACRYLIC- NICKEL 0.8 2.4 1.2
FILLED
WATER-BASED ACRYLIC EMULSION - 0.95 1.9 0.90
NICKEL
TABLE Ill
CAULKS AND GREASES
BULK RESISTANCE
NUMBER MATERIAL DESCRIPTION OHM-CM
9 COPPER-FILLED EPOXY - HARDENING 0.092
lO NICKEL-FILLED SILICONE FLEXIBLE 0,14
II CARBON-FILLED SILICONE FLEXIBLE 79
14 SILVER-COATED COPPER-FI LLED SILICONE .0008
15 SILVER-FILLED GREASE 0.21
16 NICKEL-FILLED GREASE .0019
17 CARBON-FILLED GREASE .Ol
18 CARBON FILLED - GREASE/CAULK lO.l
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6.00 6.03
5.97
0
7.5 Typical
.=_
1
[E>
i03 -41.00 0.97
All dimensions in inches.
(_ Except as otherwise specified the bond length shall be 0.50 + 0.030.
Test assembly identification. Identify and number each specimen as necessary,
_> It is optional to notch for easy breakaway without sawing.
Figure I. Standard test assembly and specimen,
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Figure 2. Pictorial test results.
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Figure 2. Concluded.
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A COMPARISON OF LIGHTNING AND NUCLEAR
ELECTROMAGNETICPULSE RESPONSEOF A HELICOPTER
C.C. Easterbrook and R.A. Perala
Electro Magnetic Applications, Inc.,
P.O. Box 26263
Denver, Colorado 80226
ABSTRACT
A numerical modeling technique is utilized to investigate the response of a helicopter to both
lightning and NEMP. The analytical approach involves the three-dimensional time domain finite-dif-
ference solutions of Maxwell's equations. Both the external currents and charges as well as the
internal electromagnetic fields and cable responses are computed. Results of the analysis indicate
that, in general, the short circuit current on internal cables is larger for lightning, whereas
the open-circuit voltages are slightly higher for NEMP. The lightning response is highly dependent
upon the rise time of the injected current as one might expect. The analysis also showed that
coupling levels to cables in a helicopter are 20 to 30 dB larger than those observed in fixed-wing
aircraft.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the technical areas under current
debate in the lightning and NEMP community is
the relationship of the lightning to NEMP re-
sponse of an aircraft. Since lightning and NEMP
both present a severe electromagnetic hazard to
helicopters and other aircraft, it is important
to recognize and understand the differences and
similarities in response to these two threats.
In particular, it is important to recognize that
hardening an aircraft to one of these threats
does not guarantee that it will be hardened to
the other. Currently there is no complete or
clear-cut answer to this problem.
The purpose of the analytical study report-
ed in this paper is to make the comparison be-
tween the two threats as they affect the same
vehicle, utilizing current understanding of the
state of the art. The aircraft chosen for analy-
sis is the Sikorsky UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter.
This vehicle is a good choice for study because
preliminary test data are available that can be
utilized to check the analytical results.
DISCUSSION
THE MODELING APPROACH - The method utilized
to model the effects of NEMP and direct lightning
attachment to the UH-60A helicopter is the three-
dimensional time domain solution of Maxwell's
equations by finite-difference techniques (1)*.
A rectangular coordinate system was chosen with
the longitudinal axis of the aircraft oriented
in the y direction, the vertical axis in the z
direction and the lateral axis in the x direc-
tion. The cell size (dx=dy=dz) was chosen to be
0.5 meters and this results in a computational
bandwidth of 15O MHz. The overall problem space
consisted of 21x49x21 = 21,609 cells. The cell
size was selected so that cell boundaries close-
ly approximated the aircraft skin. The aircraft
structure is modeled by setting the tangential
electric fields on the appropriate cell face
to zero for all t#me steps. The time step uti-
lized was O.5xlO-_ seconds, or about half that
dictated by the Courant condition for stability.
Fig.l shows a sketch of the modeled air-
craft. The surfaces and lines shown are those
representing zero tangential E field. The air-
craft cabin consists of a large cavity with
apertures at the main cabin windows (A), the
windows and composite region forward of the main
landing gear (B), and the windows surrounding
the cockpit (C). The nose electronics bay (E),
and the regions under the cowlings forward and
aft of the main rotor pylon (D) were also mod-
eled as apertures open to free space. The com-
putational test point locations are shown in
Fig. 2. Cables modeled by the finite-difference
thin-wire formalism were included inside the
*Numbers in parentheses designate References
at end of paper.
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cabin, one horizontal and one vertical as shown.
Computations were made of the short circuit cur-
rent and the open circuit voltage on both of
these wires. It is expected that the response
of these wires should be somewhat larger than
that for the actual wiring because the modeled
wires are more exposed than are the actual
wires.
THE MODELED ENVIRONMENT - NEMP simulation
requires a source outside the problem space.
This conditicn was modeled utilizing Huygens
sources (1). The electric field source waveform
is the NEMP plane wave double exponential given
by
E(L) = 5.2xi0 4 [exp (-4.0xlO6t)
(1)
-exp (-5.0xlO8t)]
Responses were computed for both topside and
left incidence. Longitudinal and lateral
polarization were modeled for topside inci-
dence and longitudinal and vertical polari-
zation were utilized for the left-side inci-
dence case.
Lightning attachment was simulated by
injecting a current into the forward tip of
the main rotor blade from the left boundary
of the problem space. Attachment to the tail
rotor was also studied, The exit point was
modeled by zeroing the electric fields along
a line from the point to the nearest problem
space boundary. This corresponds to a perfect-
ly conducting exit channel. Two exit points
were chosen for study: the left main landing
gear and the aft pointing blade of the tail
rotor. Three driving current sources were
utilized for the lightning simulation. They
are:
I. sin 2 rise to 200 kA in 2 microseconds with
exponential decay constant of 50 microsec-
2. sln L rise to 72 kA in 300 nanoseconds and
constant at 72 kA after 300 nanoseconds
3. sin 2 rise to 7.2 kA in 30 nanoseconds and
constant at 7.2 kA after 30 nanoseconds
The lightning current waveforms for 30 and
300 nanosecond rise times reflect a maximum
dl/dt of 3.75xi0 II A/s. This results in a peak
current of 7.2 kA for a 30 ns rise time, and 72
kA for a 300 ns rise time. The 200 kA waveform
represents the standard MIL-B-5087B waveform (2).
COMPUTEDRESPONSES - Five field components
were computed for each of the five test points
shown and for each of thirteen EMP test envi-
ronments. In addition, the short circuit cur-
rent and open circuit voltage on the two thin
wires were also computed for each of the 13
modeled threats giving a total of 377 specific
time domain plots. Of course, fields at all
points in the problem space were available if
required.
A summary of some representative response
data is given in Table I. Only the peak values
for each response are shown in the table.
In the table, En is the electric field
normalto the nearestsurface, Hx is the lat-
eral magneticfield, Is(Y) andIs(z) are the
short circuit currents on the longitudinal and
vertical wires respectively, andVo(Y)andVo(z)
are the associatedopencircuit voltages.
A few samplewaveformsare shownin Figs.3
throughI0. Notethe strong resonanceassociated
with the total length of the vehicle (19meters)
evident in the lateral magneticfield waveform.
Thethin-wire waveformsalso showresonances
associated with the length of the wires. A more
complete listing of the response data is given
in (3).
Magnetic field components parallel to the
aircraft skin were computed for several points
inside and outside the cabin. The outside val-
ues exceed the inside values by a factor of
I00 or more indicating a shielding factor in
excess of 40 dB. Utilizing peak wire currents
on the thin wires and the corresponding peak
injection currents, representative current
transfer functions for lightning were calcu-
lated. The values obtained are 47 dB, 47 dB
and 39 dB for 2 microseconds, 300 nanoseconds,
and 30 nanoseconds rise times respectively. The
approximate transfer functions obtained in this
way are seen to be in general accord with the
observed shielding effectiveness of the cabin
structure.
RESPONSE COMPARISONS - Simulated NEMP mea-
surements were made on a UH-60A Blackhawk at
Harry Diamond Laboratories utilizing the bi-
conic dipole radiator (4). A total of 12 bulk
current measurements were made yielding cur-
rents in the range of 3.8 A to 46 A, when scal-
ed to a 50 kV/m incident field. The mean short
circuit currents produced by the computer mo-
deling effort for the same angle of incidence
and polarization is 30 A. These two independent
results thus compare very favorably.
Lightning tests on the Blackhawk were done
by Lightning Transient Research Institute (LTRI)
(5). The induced voltage on 26 circuits was
measured utilizing a peak test current of 400 A
and a rise time of I0 microseconds. The results
were scaled to be comparable with the 200-kA 2-
microsecond rise lightning excitation utilized
in the model. The scaled voltages obtained by
LTRI for the forward rotor injection case rang-
ed from 863 Volts to 64.7 kV with the average
being 10.5 kV. Of this data set, three of the
measured voltages were extremely high, probably
because the cables penetrate to the outside of
the cabin structure. Removing these three mea-
surements from the data set, the average of the
remaining voltages is 5.4 kV, which is in close
agreement with the 4.7 kV obtained from the
UH-60A numerical model for cables inside the
cabin structure.
The analysis of the aircraft's response to
the two EMP environments shows that the short
circuit current on internal cables is larger
for lightning, and the open circuit voltage is
larger for NEMP. The lightning response greatly
depends upon the rise time of the injected cur-
rent. Open circuit voltages for a 30 ns rise-
time approach that of NEMP (20 kV vs 22 kV),
but the lightning-induced short circuit cur-
rents are less (54 A vs 72 A) than that caused
by NEMP. On the other hand, for a 2-microsecond
rise time source, the lightning-induced short
circuit current is much larger than that caused
by NEMP (441A vs 72 A) but the lightning-in-
duced voltage is much less (4.9 kV vs 22 kV).
CONCLUSIONS
The responses of a UH-60A helicopter to
both lightning and NEMP threats were computed
utilizing a finite-difference analytical tech-
nique. Results of the analysis were compared
with measurements made on the same vehicle.
The computed responses and subsequent compari-
sons give rise to the following conclusions.
Io The UH-60A cabin provides about 40 to 45 dB
of shielding to external fields which is
considerably lower than for fixed-wing air-
craft.
2. The analytical results compare favorably
with measurements made for both lightning
and NEMP, thus lending credibility to the
analytical approach.
3. Short circuit currents on internal cables
are larger for lightning than for NEMP.
4. Open circuit voltages on internal cables
are slightly higher for NEMP than for light-
ning.
5. Based on conclusions 3 and 4, the power and
energy dissipated in a load resistor at the
end of an internal cable will be larger for
lightning than for NEMP.
Finally, it should be pointed out that
only coupling responses were compared. Assess-
ment of aircraft hardness to the two threats
was not investigated. Also, only specific
environments were used, and statistics should
be included in a more complete investigation.
For these reasons, it should be emphasized that
the issues regarding the relative importance
of NEMP and lightning hazards yet require
more study.
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Table 1 - Summary of peak responses for a representative sample of test points
Test Case
EHP
,T-_-Side Incidence
Longitudinal Polarization
EMP
Top-Side Incidence
Lateral Polarization
EMP
Left-Side Incidence
Longitudinal Polarization
EMP
Left-Side Incidence
Vertical Polarization
Lightning - 2 _s Rise
Attach Forward Rotor
Exit Left Landing Gear
LightninQ - 300 ns Rise
Attach Forward Rotor
Exit Left Landing Gear
_Lightning - 30 ns Rise
Attach Forward Rotor
Exit Left Landing Gear
Lightning - 2 us Rise
Attach Forward Rotor
Exit Tail Rotor
- 300 ns Rise
rward Rotor
Exit Tail Rotor
Lightning - 30 ns Rise
Attach Forward Rotor
Exit Tail Rotor
Test Point #I
E n Hx
kV/m a/m
32.6 301
8.6 56
29.4 410
25.2 259
40xlO 3 73xi03
7.2xi03 26xi03
680 4.8xi03
44xi03 69xi03
7.2xi03 25xi03
680 4.8xi03
Test Point #3
E n Hx
kV/m a/m
98 226
25 17
88 64
28 53
15xlO 3 15xlO 3
3.2xi03 5.6xi03
297 lxlO 3
18xlO 3 14xlO 3
3,2x10 3 5.2x10 3
322 Ix103
Test Point #5'
En Hx
kV/m _ a/m
13.9 35
4.6 12
4.3 lO
3.1 7
34 670
I0 242
16 85
34 630
lO 231
16 85
Thin Wires 1
Is(Y) Vo(Y) Is(Z) Vo(Z)
A kV A kV
72 22 47 15
33 20
4O 2O
12 9
441 5 1 353 4
162 13 492 12
54 20 I09 2O
196 1197
87 450
54 106
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Figure I. Three-dimensional finite-difference model of UH-60A helicopter.
j Vertical Wire
_ Horizontal Wire
Figure 2. Location of test points and wires.
56-5 49
Figure 3. Normal electric field at test
point I, NEMP excitation - vertical
incidence, longitudinal polarization.
\
\
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Figure 4. Lateral magnetic field near top
of tail boom, NEMP excitation - ver-
tical incidence, longitudinal polar-
izatior_.
mr
54._
Figure 5. Short circuit current on
longitudinal wire, NEMP excitation -
vertical incidence, longitudinal
polarization.
Figure 6. Open circuit voltage on
longitudinal wire, NEMP excitation -
vertical incidence, longitudinal
polarization.
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Figure 7. Normal electric field at test
point I, lightning excitation -
30 nanosecond rise time, 7.2 kA peak.
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Figure 8. Lateral magnetic field near
top of tail boom, lightning exci-
tation - 30 nanosecond rise time,
7.2 kA peak.
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Figure 9. Short circuit current on
longitudinal wire, lightning exci-
tation - 30 nanosecond rise time,
7.2 kA peak.
Figure I0. Open circuit voltage on
longitudinal wire, lightning
excitation - 30 nanosecond rise time,
7.2 kA peak.
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A COMPARISON OF LIGHTNING AND NUCLEAR
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE RESPONSE OF TACTICAL SHELTERS
R. A. Perala,
T. H. Rudolph, and
P. M. McKenna
Electro Magnetic Applications, Inc.
P. O. Box 26263
Denver, Colorado 80226
ABSTRACT
One of the technical areas under current debate in the lightning and NEMP communities is the
relationship between the lightning and NEMP responses of systems. In this paper, we address the
internal response (electromagnetic fields and cable responses) of tactical shelters.
Tactical shelters are usually well-shielded systems. Apart from penetrations by signal and
power lines, the main leakage paths to the interior are via seams and the environment control
unit (ECU) honeycomb filter.
In this paper, we employ the time domain three-dimensional finite-difference technique to
determine the external and internal coupling to a shelter excited by NEMP and attached lightning.
The responses of interest are the internal electromagnetic fields and the voltage, current, power,
and energy coupled to internal cables. Leakage through the seams and ECU filter is accomplished
by their transfer impedances which relate internal electric fields to external current densities.
Transfer impedances which have been experimentally measured are used in the analysis. The internal
numerical results are favorably compared to actual shelter test data under simulated NEMP illumi-
nation.
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INTRODUCTION
Many DOD C3 systems are required to be
mobile or portable. A typical system consists
of a shelter which contains numerous electronic
subsystems and some operating personnel. The
shelter usually provides an electromagnetic
shield for this equipment. The shelter almost
always requires penetrations from the outside
world via long telephone lines, power lines,
antennas, etc. Other electromagnetic penetrations
into the shelter occur because of seams in the
skin and environmental control unit (ECU) vents.
The objective of the research reported in
this paper is to compare the nuclear electro-
magnetic pulse (NEMP) and lightning response of
a shelter. The study is mainly limited to pene-
trations via seams and ECU vents. The NEMP re-
sponse is calculated both for field illumina-
tion of the shelter and for current induced on
the shelter skin by attached long lines.
In this paper we will discuss the basic
shielding concepts, give an example comparison
between measured and calculated internal respon-
ses, and present the lightning/NEMP comparisons.
Finally, conclusions are given.
BASIC SHIELDING CONCEPTS
BACKGROUND - The basic element of protect-
ion provided by shelters is the shielding pro-
vided by the skin. Apart from penetration of
this shielding envelope by cables or antennas,
energy can penetrate through the shield via dif-
fusion through the skin and by leakage through
imperfections in the skin. Therefore, the items
of interest to be considered here are:
I. Diffusion through the skin material
2. Penetration through permanent seams
3. Penetration through ECU (environmental
control unit) openings
4. Penetration through door seams
DIFFUSION THROUGH THE BASIC SKIN MATERIAL -
Diffusion through the skin material can be easi-
ly estimated if one knows the external surface
current density Js(_) on the shelter skin and
the skin transfer impedance ZT(.._) according to:
E(_) = ZT js(_) (I)
and A
q
ZT(_) = sinhjkd (2)
.
where n IS the intrinsic wave impedance, k is
the propagation constant in the metal skin, d
is the skin thickness, and E(_) is the internal
electric field tangential to the shelter skin.
It can be shown (1,2)* that for metal thick-
nesses commonly used in shelter construction,
diffusion is insignificant for EMP. EMP-induced
voltages are less than a few millivolts. Diffu-
sion for lightning can be more important, pri-
marily because of the much larger and slower
currents which are incident on the shelter ex-
terior. Internal induced voltages on the order
*Numbers in parentheses designate references
at end of paper.
of a few volts are possible, depending upon the
skin material and thickness.
However, for both EMP and lightning, it
can be shown :hat the largest voltages induced
on internal cables occur via the imperfections
in the skin, which is the main focus of this
paper.
LEAKAGE THROUGH SEAMS - Seams are tradi-
tionally the weak spots in any electromagnetic-
ally shielded enclosure. The main objective is
to provide a low seam impedance Zs to minimize
leakage. In terms of the exterior surface cur-
rent density Js (amperes per meter), the voltage
Vs induced across the seam is given by
Vs(,) _, is< ) • 7s(_) (3)
If a wire were routed behind the seam, the
voltage Vs would be the maximum voltage that would
be induced on _t. In addition, there is a seam
transfer admittance Y$ which relates the current
induced on ar_ internal nearby wire to the ex-
ternal voltage. It has been found for good
quality seams that the transfer admittance Ys
is dominated b3 Zs in all cases of practical
interest and the discussion thereby focuses
on Zs.
Also, Vs depends upon the direction of cur-
rent flow with respect to _he seam. Largest in-
duced voltages occur when Js is normal to the
seam direction. When Js is parallel to the seam
direction, the induced voltage is much smaller
(3). The discussion therefore centers on the
normal orientation indicated in Fig. I.
For normal current flow, Equation (3) can
be written in the time domain as
i
Vs(t) = [_s÷Ls _-{ ] Js(t) (4)
where Rs ant L_. are the transfer resistance and
inductance in _nits of Ohm-m and Henry-m, re-
spectively.
There is a significant amount of seam data
in the trar_fer impedance format (3-6). A few
selected examI_les will be given here to illus-
trate typical values of seam impedance for vari-
ous conditions.
An e_a1_ple of the transfer impedance of a
bolted seam is given in Fig. 2. It should be
noted that th!s figure also illustrates the ef-
fects of exposure to a salt fog environment per
MIL-STD-210B Method 509 (7), and a temperature/
humidity environment per MIL-STD-202, Method
106B (8). Fig. 3 shows the inpedance of a qasketed
seam. A summary of other data on gasketed seams
is given in Fig. 4 for different contact sur-
faces, contact pressures, and for aging effects.
The significant feature for this type of data
is that seam transfer impedances can be readily
made to be less than IO-3 Ohm-m.
The magnetic polarizability per unit length
m is related to the seam inductance L s by
L s = i.om (5)
The term m has been measured for several types of
bolted and riveted seams under various circumstances
(3). A summary of some of the data is shown in
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Table I. Of particular interest are the values
for aluminum riveted panels (the rivets were
on 2" centers). A value of .63xi0 -6 was ob-
tained for 5-cm overlap, 5-cm centers, and an
untreated surface.
LEAKAGE THROUGH ECU (ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
UNIT) OPENINGS - The shelter must have an ECU
opening in the shelter skin which must be pro-
tected. Two methods are possible: screen or
honeycomb filters. Honeycomb is favored over
screen although the honeycomb is more expen-
sive. MIL-STD-285 (9) type data comparisons show
that honeycomb offers more shielding than does
screen from the same air flow aperture (lO) for
the same shielding effectiveness.
Coupling occurs through air-vent filters
by means of the transfer inductance L s according
to:
_Js
Et = Ls _t (6)
where Et is the transmitted electric field.
Values 6f L s have been measured for several
types of filters (4,5,11). Data for a rather good
filter are shown in Fig. 5. The inductance for
this filter at I0 MHz is about 16 pH.
AN EXAMPLE OF ELECTROMAGNETIC CAPABILITY (EMC)
AND ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) SHIELDING OF AN
$280 SHELTER (12)
There are no test data available regardinq
the lightning-induced internal response of shel-
ters. Such data do exist, however, for the
NEMP response of several shelters. One example
is given here because it compares measured re-
sults with numerically predicted results and
forms a basis for validating some of the con-
cepts described here.
Harry Diamond Laboratories has developed a
prototype single-skin shelter called HATS (Hard-
ened Army Tactical Shelter). EMP and EMC (MIL-
STD-285) measurements were done on this shelter
(12) and it is informative to compare these re-
sults. The pertinent features of the shelter are
I. Single .03." Al Skin, $280 Size
2. Bolted Seams on 2" Centers
3. l" Overlap of Seams
4. No Special Surface Treatment of Seams
(Ordinary AI)
5. No Special Efforts Were Done to Make
This an "RF-Tight" Shelter
6. Manufacturer: Craig
7. Before EMC/EMP Measurements, Shelter
Was Subjected to 1981 MILLRACE 9.1 PSI
Overpressure Test with Air Conditioning
Units Attached
8. MIL-STD-285 Test Done Just Prior to EMP
Test
9. EMP Test at HDL's AESOP Threat Level
Simulator at More Than Twice Threat
lO. Pretest Analytical Predictions Done by
EMA Based on Seam Data Previously Dis-
cussed
If. ECU Openings Covered by Gasketed Panels
The EMC test was done according to MIL-STD-
285. The results are more fully discussed in (12
and are only summarized here. The interesting
result from these tests is that the magnetic
field shielding at 150 kHz was measured to be as
low as 38 dB.
Figs. 6 and 7 show measured typical in-
ternal magnetic and electric fields for the
NEMP test, which was conducted with the Army's
AESOP simulator at more than twice the threat
level (123 kV/m vs 50 kV/m). The vertical
scales are in volts of sensor output, but the
peak values in MKS units are also indicated.
It should be pointed out that the late time
falloff of the magnetic fields is caused by
the probe's low-frequency response limitations.
First, the calculated internal responses are
somewhat higher than those measured, indicating
the 10 -3 _-m is an upper bound for the seam
impedances.
Pretest predictions were done (12, 13) of
the shelter response for a horizontally polar-
ized plane wave incident at 31 ° above the ho-
rizontal. The modeling approach is described
in the next section. The seam impedances which
were used in the analysis are 10 -3 _-m, re-
sistive. The incident field is modeled as a
fast rising (<I0 ns) pulse with a decaying tail
whose zero crossover is 900 ns. The responses
shown in Figs. 8 and 9 are normalized for a
50 kV/m incident field.
Because the predictions and measurements
were done for different angles of incidence and
polarization, they cannot be directly compared.
However, several important observations and
conclusions can be made. Comparisons of pre-
dictions and measured data also indicate that
the seams are primarily resistive and not in-
ductive. If the seams were inductive, the in-
ternal electromagnetic fields would look like
the derivative of those given in Figs. 6-9.
The HATS data can be summarized as follows:
I. EMC tests showed 38 dB per MIL-STD-285
at 150 kHz
2. EMP shielding effectiveness for verti-
cally polarized incidence (Ein c = 123
kV/m, H_n c = 225 A/m):
a. H Fields (33 Measurements)
Average: .033 A/m SE = 76 dB
Max: .16 A/m SE = 63 dB
b. E Fields (lO Measurements)
Average: .50 V/m SE = 108 dB
Max: .80 V/m SE = 104 dB
3. EMP shielding effectiveness for hori-
zontally polarized incidence (Einc =
73 kV/m, Hinc _ 190 A/m (estimated)):
H-Fields (2 measurements): .01 and .04
A/m, SE = 86 dB and 74 dB
4. Numerical predictions for 50 kV/m in-
cident fields based on 10-30hm-m seams
gives maximum values for H of .26 A/m
and E of 1 V/m, thus indicating that
this is a conservative number for.actual
seams
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5. It is observed that the magnetic fields
are time integrals of the seam voltages
and thus the external surface currents.
The inside of the shelter thus acts like
an inductor driven by the seam voltage
source, with the magnetic field repre-
sented by the inductor current.
COMPARISON OF CALCULATED SHELTER NEMP AND
LIGHTNING RESPONSE ANALYSIS APPROACH
In this section, the response of a shel-
ter to NEMP and lightning is calculated.
The shelter of interest is indicated in
Fig, I0. It is 4.5 ft above the lossy earth and
is supported by four metallic supports which are
in contact with the soil. The shelter has seams
along all edges and all edges of the door. In
addition, it is assumed that the shelter is made
out of aluminum sheet metal such that there are
also vertical seams spaced four feet apart on
each vertical surface and horizontal seams
spaced four feet apart on each horizontal sur-
face.
There is an ECU vent with honeycomb as in-
dicated. It is assumed to be 18" square.
The shelter is empty except for a horizon-
tal and vertical wire placed as shown in Fig. lO.
Results are calculated for three sources:
I. A standard unclassified (14) 50 kV/m
double exponential NEMP plane wave nor-
mally incident from above and polarized
parallel to the long dimension of the
shelter
2. NEMP-induced current from a semiinfinite
long line (e.g. power or signal line),
injected on the end of the shelter as
shown in Fig. I0. The current waveform
is shown in Fiq. II (15)
3. A MIL-B-5087B (16) (200 kA, 2x50 _sec)
lightning current waveform attached to
a corner of the shelter as shown. The
shelter is located above a lossy earth
with soil conductivity = 0.01 S/m, and
a relative dielectric constant of I0
The analysis approach is the three-dimen-
sional time domain finite-difference technique
(17). This approach is a fully three-dimensional
solution of Maxwell's equations in a Cartesian
c_ordinate system. The cell size used for all
calculations is I/2 m and the time step is .75
ns. Because the upper frequency limit of the
code is determined by requiring that approxima-
tely five cells are needed to resolve the wave-
length of the highest frequency of interest, the
upper frequency limit is approximately 120 MHz.
For external coupling solutions, absorbing
boundary conditions are used at the boundaries
of the problem space to reduce reflections. For
NEMP field illumination, a Huygen's surface is
defined around the shelter and some of the soil
such that some of this surface includes the
shelter and any conductors to ground. The sources
for the Huygen's surface include both the
incident NEMP plane wave and the ground-reflect-
ed field for those sources above the soil-air
interface, and the field transmitted in the soil
for the sources below this interface. The fields
reflected from the soil and transmitted into
the soil are determined from the well-known
frequency dependent plane wave reflection and
transmission coefficients.
The procedure is to first calculate the
external current and charge densities on the
shelter surface. The external current densities
at the seam and ECU locations are then stored
in a file and used as source terms to derive
the shelter interior.
The boundary conditions on the wall of the
shelter interior are the usual ones for the
tangential E and normal H fields on a perfect
conductor. The interior of the cavity is excited
by the tangential E field at the inside surface
of a seam or ECU opening. This field is speci-
fied by the external surface current density
Js and transfer impedance. The tangential E-
field at the inside surface of an ECU opening
is given by
:_Js (t)
EL(t) = Ls _t (7)
and for a resistive seam, by
EL(t) = Rm a s (t) / A (8)
where Ls is the ECU transfer inductance and
RT is the transfer resistance of the seam, and
,'_ is the appropriate grid spacing. The seam
transfer inductance is neglected because test
data show that internal coupling is mainly re-
sistive.
The internal fields are therefore solved
by the same 3D finite-difference approach using
the expressions in equations (7) and (8) as
sources - the response of the internal cables
is done by the finite-difference thin-wire
approximation (17).
Seam impedances of .001 _.m are used in
the basic calculations, along with an ECU trans-'
fer inductance of I0 pH. Seam transfer impe-
dances are assumed to be resistive because
actual shelter test data show this to be the
case. Results are also predicted for the door
seams degraded by a factor I0 (Z s = .01 _.m).
This is to account for the effects of degrad-
ation of the door gasketing.
Four responses are calculated for each
internal cable: open-circuit voltage, short cir-
cuit current, power dissipated on a I0 _ load,
and the total energy dissipated in this load at
1 _sec. A I0 !_ load was chosen because it re-
presents an estimate of the bulk impedance of
a semiconductor device,
The electromagnetic fields are observed at
six internal locations specified in Fig. 12.
In the interest of brevity, no external
coupling results are presented here. A summary
of the internal results is given in Table 2.
The maximum electric and magnetic fields are
the maximum peak values observed at any of the
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six observation points. The cable responses are
the maximum response for either the vertical
or horizontal cable.
The cable responses indicated in Table 2
would be the worst-case response of unshielded
conductors and would represent the worst-case
hazard to electronics boxes.
It should be pointed out that these re-
sults are conservative because:
I. No reliance is made upon cable shield-
ing
2. No reliance is made upon the effect of
current sharing on multiple-cable
bundles
3. The cables studied are of maximum length
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results indicate the following:
I. The dominant NEMP shelter response oc-
curs by means of currents induced on
the shelter from long cables attached
to the shelter, and not from direct
field illumination.
2. The attached worst-case lightning in-
duced internal response far exceeds that
of the NEMP response. The internal
fields and induced cable voltages and
currents are larger by more than an or-
der of magnitude. The power and energy
induced in a IO _ load are about three
orders of magnitude larger than those
caused by NEMP.
3. Seam impedances can be characterized
by seam transfer resistances. The in-
ductance does not appear to play a
major role, based on actual measurements
and computations.
4. Seam resistances on the order of .OOl
_.m can be used to find the internal
response of a shelter.
It should be pointed out that this investi-
gation includes coupling only, and does not consti-
tute an assessment of an actual system to the two
hazards. Statistical and operational requirement
considerations also need to be included in any
complete assessment of a sheltered system. For
this reason, it is premature to make any final
judgments regarding the relative importance of the
lightning and NEMP hazards.
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TABLE 1 - MAGNETIC POLARIZABILITY PER UNIT LENGTH OF VARIOUS SEAMS (3)
Panel Material PolarizabilityJoint Problem (m3/m x 10-6)
¢-
.r-
E
0
(,..)
Q_
4-
E
,e-
Galvanized Steel
Galvanized steel
Galvanized steel
lO-cm overlap
18-cm bolt spacing
(3 bolts)
4 m-kg torque
5-cm overlap
9-cm bolt spacing
(5 bolts)
4-m-kg torque
lO-cm overlap I.
7.5-cm bolt spacing 2.
(6 bolts)
I. None 1.3
2. One 7.5-cm wide 3.0
plastic strip
3. Two 7.5-cm wide 4.5
plastic strips
4. O.13-mm plastic 35.0
spacer in joint
I. None 0.16"
2. One 2.5-cm wide 0.43
plastic strip
3. Two 2.5-cm wide 0.56
plastic strips
4. Four 2.5-cm wide 0.53
plastic strips
None 0.08*
Five 2.5-cm wide 0.26
plastic strips Note:
2" Center
on Ri vet
c-
o
T_
ro
c-
t-
o
(=)
(D
u
4-
K-
Aluminum riveted
panels
Hot rolled steel
Cold rolled steel
5-cm overlap I. None 0.63
5-cm spacing 2. Painted surface 3.1
lO-cm overlap I. None (galvanized 0.08*
7.5-cm bolt spacing steel)
(6 bolts) 2. Surface scale 9.9
4 m-kg torque 3, Surface scale 1.3
removed
lO-cm overlap I. None (galvanized 0.08*
7.5-cm bolt spacing steel)
(6 bolts) 2, Rusty joint 190
4-m-kg torque
0
K-
0
r-_
"Z
e-
Galvanized steel
Galzanized steel
5-cm overlap I. None 4.0
18-cm bolt spacing 2. Warped panels 4.1
(3 bolts)
4-m-kg torque
lO-cm overlap I. None 0.08*
7.5-cm bolt spacing 2. Warped panels 0,01"
(6 bolts) 3. Bent up edges 0.29
4 m-kg torque
Not rolled steel lO-cm overlap I. None (flat washers)
7.5-cm bolt spacing 2. Lock washers
(6 bolts)
4 m-kg torque
Galvanized steel lO-cm overlap
9-cm bolt spacing
(5 bolts)
•_ 4 m-kg torque
Galvanized steel lO-cm overlap I. None
7.5-cm bolt spacing 2. 3-mm rope caulking
(6 bolts) in joint
4 m-kg torque
• This Measurement is Near the Measurement Threshold
2.2
2.5
I. None 0.16"
2. Rubber washers under 0.21
bolts and nuts
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TABLE 2 - SUMMARYOF INTERNAL SHELTER RESPONSES
Numbers not in parentheses indicate results with all shelter seam
impedances = 0.001 _.m. Results in parentheses are for the same
case except that door seam impedances = 0.01 _'m.
NEMP Field NEMP Current Attached
lllumination Injected From Lightning
Long Lines
Emax (V/m)
Hmax (A/m)
Voc (v)
Isc (A)
PIO_ (mW)
EIO _ (nJ)
1,2 1,8
(I .7) (3.4)
•042 3.0
(.062) (3.4)
1.2 1.4
(I.7) (4.1)
•068 .40
(.087) (1.1)
22 104
(37) (2054)
14 181
(19) (3604)
33
(62)
37
(77)
22
(57)
9.3
(24)
1.5 x 105
(2 x I06)
9.7 x 104
(1.3 x IO b)
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+ - V$
Fig. 1 - Surface current density flowing
across a seam.
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Fig. 2 - Seam impedance for typical bolted seams, showing environment effects (5)
T/H temperature/humidity test.
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Fig. 3 - Seam impedance for a Spira gasketed seam (5),
pli = pounds per linear inch.
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Fig. 4 - Transfer impedance of selected gasketed seams (lO).
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Fig. 5 - The (experimental) values of attenuation and surface transfer impedance Zmeas for
metallic honeycomb (I/8' x I/2 steel, ]0" x 10" frame, Tecknit #64-90055; steel
shield plate) (5, II).
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Fig. 6 - Measured internal magnetic field for vertically polarized illumination
(Ein c = 123 kV/m) .
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Fig. 7 - Measured electric field for vertically polarized illumination
(Ein c : 123 kV/m).
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Fig. 8 - Calculated value of Hx, horizontal
E-field polarization, angle of inci-
dence 31o, incident field I kV/m,
maximum peak internal field, shelter
4' above ground, resistive seams 12
each, crossover of incident field is
900 ns.
Fig. 9 - Calculated value of Ey.
J
H- -ECU
.5'_"_ Vertical Test Cable 7 "7
U /Horizontal Test U 4,5'_'" 8'
Cable
Induced
Current
From
Long Lines
q
Fig. 10 - Pictorial representation of finite difference model of shelter.
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Fig. 11 - NEMP-induced short circuit current injected on a shelter from a semi-infinitely
long overland line 10 m above a perfectly conducting ground plane (17).
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Fig. 12 - Internal measurement points for electromagnetic fields, all points are
midway between ceiling and floor.
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